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Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA'9 to protect and enhance the environment and in doing so
based the national environmental policy contained in section 101 of
NEPA on the precept that man must establish a harmonious relation-
ship with nature. In interpreting NEPA to be "essentially procedural, "
however, the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have precluded the fulfillment of
NEPA's substantive goals. This article will demonstrate that the Court's
method of statutory construction applied in Amoco Production Co. and
the scope of review employed in State Farm suggest that the Court's and
the Ninth Circuit's interpretation and application of NEPA are no
longer sound. Hence, NEPA's environmentally-based substantive goals
should be elevated above its procedural mandate. Consequently, envi-
ronmental impact statements ("EIS's") and agency actions pursuant to
Copyright © 1988 by Alaska Law Review
* J.D., 1988, Duke University School of Law; M.A., 1988, Duke University
School of Forestry & Environmental Studies (Resource Economics & Policy); B.A.
cum laude, 1983, Carleton College (Geology). The author has accepted a position as
an associate with the environmental section of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom, in the firm's Washington, D.C., office.
The author would like to thank Professor Christopher Schroeder for his helpful
comments and especially to thank Carolyn and B.G.
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
completed EIS's should be found adequate only if they comply with
NEPA's substantive goals. That is, only those "major Federal actions"
that protect and enhance the environment should be permitted to
proceed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Alaska is a land of incomparable grandeur. No other state and
few countries can boast as Alaska can of its wilderness, wildlife, natu-
ral resources, and scenic beauty. Alaska's physical and biological at-
tributes, however, are fragile, susceptible to exploitation and
degradation. Man must be cognizant of his actions, carefully consid-
ering the impact of his endeavors before undertaking any project or
activity that will alter nature's scheme. Responsible development in
Alaska, however, is complicated by the array of private, state, Native,
and federal ownership interests. Following the enactment of the
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act ("ANILCA"),I the
federal government owned 225.2 million of Alaska's 375 million acres,
the state 104.5 million acres, the Natives 44 million acres, and private
parties the remaining 1.3 million acres.2 Owning approximately sixty
percent of the acreage, the federal government is the major player in
Alaska land ownership; therefore, its activities play an important role
in the preservation and development of Alaska's natural resources.
Numerous federal statutes3 control both federal and nonfederal
activities affecting Alaska's natural resources and environment. The
majority of these statutes control the development of particular re-
sources or the pollution of certain mediums. In contrast, the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA") 4 is a general statute,
1. Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 16 U.S.C., 43 U.S.C. & 48 U.S.C.).
2. See P. WAYBURN, ADVENTURING IN ALASKA 74 (1982). The state and Na-
tive allotments do not represent actual acreage under ownership, but rather the total
ownership to which these groups are entitled. See Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act ("ANCSA") § 12, 43 U.S.C. § 1611 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (Native allotment);
Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, §§ 5 & 6, 72 Stat. 339, 340 (1958) (state
allotment).
3. See, e.g., ANILCA, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C., 43 U.S.C. & 48 U.S.C.); Marine Mammal
Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Endangered Species
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Mineral Leasing Act of 1920,
30 U.S.C. §§ 181-263 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7642 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-
1356 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); ANCSA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (1982 & Supp. III
1985).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370c (1982).
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establishing a national environmental policy for the nation. The envi-
ronmental policy - NEPA's substance - is founded on Congress'
belief that the "Federal Government, in cooperation with state and
local governments, and other concerned public and private organiza-
tions [must] ... use all practicable means and measures ... to create
and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in pro-
ductive harmony." 5 NEPA imposes nondiscretionary procedural re-
quirements 6 on any federal agency engaging in an activity that
constitutes a "major Federal action[ ] significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment." 7
Few Alaskans are untouched by the requirements of NEPA. Sec-
tion 102(2)(C) requires an agency to complete an Environmental Im-
pact Statement ("EIS") before engaging in an activity involving a
"major Federal action[ ].,,8 In Alaska, 264 final EIS's were completed
between 1971 and 1987. 9 These EIS's were completed for a variety of
"major Federal actions," including, for example: forty-seven special
purpose federal lands 0 designations and management plans; forty-
four road and highway projects; twenty-six harbor projects; twenty-six
oil, gas, and mineral leasing and development activities; eighteen na-
tional forest timber sales; eleven fishery projects; ten airport projects;
six military installations and nuclear weapons tests; six power plant
5. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1982).
6. See NEPA section 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982), discussed infra
text accompanying notes 62-69; see also Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350-51
(1979) ("NEPA contains "'action forcing' procedures" that "require[]" " 'detailed
statement' "); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409 (1976) (section 102(2)(C) is
"'action forcing' "); Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 422 U.S. 289, 319 (1975) ("NEPA does create a dis-
crete procedural obligation"); Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 1985)
("NEPA requires an [EIS] for 'major Federal actions...' "); Save Our Ecosystems v.
Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1984) ("NEPA requires an [EIS] for 'major
federal [sic] actions ... '"); Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 1971)
("federal agencies which undertake activities which may affect the environment must
prepare and submit [an EIS]"); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United
States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("[NEPA's
procedural] provisions are not highly flexible.... [T]hey establish a strict standard of
compliance.").
7. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982).
8. Id.
9. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATE-
MENT (1971-86) TITLE INDEX FOR ALASKA (1987); 52 Fed. Reg. 1,945, 12,980,
21,629, 37,535, 41,328, 43,129 & 45,253 (1987).
10. These lands include: (1) national parks; (2) national forests; (3) national wil-
derness areas; (4) national wildlife refuges; (5) national monuments; (6) national wild
and scenic river systems; (7) national recreation areas; (8) national wildlands; and
(9) national ranges.
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projects; five water projects; four sewage treatment and solid waste
disposal projects; and four oil and gas transportation systems."I
Although NEPA establishes "substantive goals for the Nation,"' 2
the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit have interpreted the Act's mandate to be
"essentially procedural."' 3 Consequently, the courts generally review
the adequacy of EIS's with extreme deference. 14 As established by the
Supreme Court, when reviewing the sufficiency of an EIS:
Neither the statute nor its legislative history contemplates that a
court should substitute its judgment for that of an agency as to the
environmental consequences of its actions. The only role for a court
11. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATE-
MENT TITLE (1971-86) INDEX FOR ALASKA (1987); 52 Fed. Reg. 1,945, 12,980,
21,629, 37,535, 41,328, 43,129 & 45,253 (1987).
12. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978), quoted in Strycker's Bay Neighborhood
Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980); accord Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427
U.S. 390, 409 (1976) ("NEPA announced a national policy of environmental protec-
tion"); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 693 (1973) ("NEPA, one of the... major federal efforts at
reversing the deterioration of the country's environment, declares 'that it is the contin-
uing policy of the Federal Government... to use all practicable means and measures
... in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and
maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony,
and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future genera-
tions of Americans.' 42 U.S.C. § 4331 [(1982)]").
NEPA's substantive goals, as defined in section 101 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4331
(1982), are discussed infra in Section IV.
13. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978), quoted in Strycker's Bay Neighborhood
Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980); accord City of Davis v. Coleman,
521 F.2d 661, 670 (9th Cir. 1975); Alpine Lakes Protection Soc'y v. Schlapfer, 518
F.2d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 1975); see also Karp, The NEPA Regulations, 19 AM. Bus.
L.J. 295, 315-16 (1981) ("when the courts review the substantive decision, they speak
vaguely about applying Section 101(b) criteria, but show little vigor in measuring the
agency decision by those standards. In short, agencies that have played the proce-
dural game properly - prepared adequate EIS's - have had little reason to fear that
their substantive decisions would be overturned." (footnotes omitted)); Strohbehn,
NEPA 's Impact on Federal Decisionmaking: Examples of Noncompliance and Sugges-
tions for Change, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 93, 95 (1974) (agencies view NEPA as essentially
procedural).
14. Professors Richard Goldsmith and William Banks observed that one of the
consequences of the Supreme Court finding NEPA to be "essentially procedural" is
that the lower federal courts "are enforcing NEPA with diminished rigor ...
[U]nder the influence of Strycker's Bay, some of the lower courts now seem to be
reviewing agency action under NEPA far less closely than they review other types of
agency action. This extreme deference to the federal bureaucracy invites the mockery
of NEPA ...." Goldsmith & Banks, Environmental Values: Institutional Responsi-
bility and the Supreme Court, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1983).
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is to insure that the agency has taken a "hard look" at environmen-
tal consequences; it cannot "interject itself within the area of discre-
tion of the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken."' 15
In other words, as the Court explained in Baltimore Gas and Electric
Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 16 "[tjhe role of the
courts is simply to ensure that the agehcy has adequately considered
and disclosed the environmental impact of its actions and that its deci-
sion is not arbitrary or capricious." 17 Furthermore, the Court held
that in completing the "hard look" the agency need not "elevate envi-
ronmental concerns over other appropriate considerations." '
The Ninth Circuit invokes one of two review standards depending
upon the nature of the claim. First, when considering whether an EIS
complies with NEPA's requirements, the Ninth Circuit applies the
"rule of reason."' 19 Under this standard, which represents an applica-
tion of section 706(2)(D) of the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"),20 the reviewing court is limited to determining whether:
15. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976); accord Baltimore Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97-98 (1983);
Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980);
Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605, 613 (9th Cir. 1984); California v. Block,
690 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 1982).
In analyzing the Court's decision in Strycker's Bay, in which the Court employed
language similar to that quoted and found NEPA to be "essentially procedural," 444
U.S. at 227-28, Professors Richard Goldsmith and William Banks conclude that the
Court held "that a federal court may not set aside agency action as 'arbitrary and
capricious' on the theory that the agency gave insufficient weight to the substantive
goals enumerated in NEPA." Goldsmith & Banks, supra note 14, at 11. The Court's
decision in Baltimore Gas seems to further support this observation. See infra notes
245-68 and accompanying text.
16. 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
17. Id. at 97-98 (1983) (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 415-17 (1971)).
18. Id. at 97 (citation omitted); accord Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council,
Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227, 228 n.2 (1980).
19. See, e.g., Enos v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 1363, 1372 (9th Cir. 1985); California v.
Block, 690 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 1982); accord Village of False Pass v. Watt, 565 F.
Supp. 1123, 1143-44 (D. Alaska 1983), aff'd, 733 F.2d 605, 613 (9th Cir. 1984).
20. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (1982). Section (2)(D) of the APA provides:
The reviewing court shall -
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and con-
clusions found to be -
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
1988]
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[T]he Final [EIS] contain[s] "a reasonably thorough discussion of
the significant aspects of the probable environmental conse-
quences," and ... [whether] its "form, content and preparation fos-
ter both informed decision-making and informed public
participation." Once satisfied that the Secretary [of the Interior]
has taken this procedural and substantive "hard look" at environ-
mental consequences in the Final Statement, our review is at an
end.2 '
As explained by the court in Lathan v. Brinegar,2 2 the Ninth Circuit
adopted this standard of review "because NEPA is essentially a proce-
dural statute."'23
The arbitrary and capricious standard24 is the second type of re-
view used in the Ninth Circuit. The courts apply this standard when
determining the lawfulness of an adminstrator's decision that is made
pursuant to the considerations and conclusions contained in an EIS. 25
The Ninth Circuit views the arbitrary and capricious standard as pro-
viding a higher degree of deference to an agency's action than the level
of deference owed under the "rule of reason."'2 6 Despite this ap-
proach, the "rule of reason" and the arbitrary and capricious standard
applied by the Supreme Court are indistinguishable. Both standards
require the reviewing court to determine whether the administrator
has taken a "hard look" at the environmental consequences of the pro-
posed decision. 27 Therefore, the scope of review under the two stan-
dards employed in the Ninth Circuit should be considered analogous.
21. Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605, 613 (9th Cir. 1984) (citations
omitted); accord Enos v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 1363, 1372 (9th Cir. 1985); California v.
Block, 690 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 1982).
22. 506 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
23. Id., quoted in Village of False Pass v. Watt, 565 F. Supp. 1123, 1143 (D.
Alaska 1983), aff'd, 733 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1984).
24. The arbitrary and capricious standard of review is included in section
706(2)(A) of the APA, which provides:
The reviewing court shall -
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and con-
clusions found to be -
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
wise not in accordance with law;
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
25. See, e.g., Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677, 692 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc);
Village of False Pass v. Watt, 565 F. Supp. 1123, 1143 (D. Alaska 1983), aff'd, 733
F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1984).
26. See, e.g., Lathan, 506 F.2d at 692-93, quoted in Village of False Pass, 565 F.
Supp. at 1142-43.
27. Compare Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605, 613 (9th Cir. 1984) with
Baltimore Gas & Elee. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87,
97-98 (1983).
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Nevertheless, because of the high level of deference to an adminis-
trative agency historically owed by a reviewing court under these two
standards,28 and because its review is limited to an agency's compli-
ance with NEPA's procedural mandate, the adequacy of an EIS or the
integrity of an adminstrator's decision to proceed with a project pursu-
ant to a completed EIS is rarely challenged. Although 264 final EIS's
have been completed in Alaska, only five final EIS's and one draft EIS
have been challenged on the grounds that they were inadequate, and/
or administrative action pursuant to the completed EIS was arbitrary
and capricious. 29 No challenges to administrative action have been
based on a completed EIS. This sparse litigation record most likely
would differ if parties could challenge the adequacy of either an EIS or
an administrator's action pursuant to an EIS on the grounds that they
failed to fulfill NEPA's substantive mandate. The deference owed an
agency would be significantly reduced: a reviewing court would not
only have to determine that the agency had complied with NEPA's
procedural mandate, but also would be required to find that the EIS or
the administrator's decision fulfilled NEPA's broad substantive goals,
which are contained in section 101.
30
In addition to encouraging litigation, such a change in the scope
of judicial review would alter significantly agency decisionmaking
under NEPA. A close analysis of section 101 and its legislative his-
tory reveals that the Court's determination that an agency need not
28. See infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
29. Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 485-86 (D.C. Cir.) (final EIS prepared by the
Bureau of Land Management for the sale of offshore oil and gas leases in the Gulf of
Alaska found inadequate for failure to consider certain alternatives), vacated in part
sub nom. Western Oil & Gas Assoc. v. Alaska, 439 U.S. 922 (1978); Wilderness Soc'y
v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (final EIS prepared by the Department
of the Interior for construction of the trans-Alaska pipeline challenged for failure ade-
quately to consider alternatives, and court found NEPA issues unripe for adjudica-
tion), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973); International Fund for Animal Welfare v.
Baldridge, 594 F. Supp. 129, 132-33 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (draft EIS prepared by the Sec-
retary of Commerce for killing of 22,000 subadult male seals found adequate); Village
of False Pass v. Watt, 565 F. Supp. 1123, 1165 (D. Alaska 1983) (final EIS prepared
by the Department of the Interior for an offshore oil and gas lease in the St. George
Basin of the Bering Sea found inadequate for failure to consider the dangers to whales
presented by preliminary seismic activity), aff'd, 733 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1984); North
Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 347-49 (D. D.C.) (final EIS prepared by
the Department of the Interior for an offshore oil and gas lease sale in the Beaufort
Sea found wanting for failure to consider adequately cumulative impacts and alterna-
tives), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Aleut League v.
Atomic Energy Comm'n, 337 F. Supp. 534, 542-46 (D. Alaska 1971) (final EIS pre-
pared by Atomic Energy Commission for detonation of nuclear bomb (code named
CANNIKIN) on Amchitka Island found adequate under NEPA).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1982), discussed infra Section IV.
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"elevate environmental concerns over other appropriate considera-
tions"31 undermines the national environmental policy espoused in
section 101.32 NEPA's substantive goals, which are premised on the
need to protect the environment, 33 require environmental values to be
given priority over economic and, in some instances, social factors.
In light of the scope of review under the arbitrary and capricious
standard adopted by the Supreme Court in Motor Vehicle Manufactur-
ers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 34 and
its recent decision in Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 35
these observations are not merely academic. This article first reviews
these judicial developments and then discusses how NEPA's require-
ments would differ if either an EIS or an adminstrator's action pursu-
ant to an EIS were adequate only if, in addition to fulfilling NEPA's
procedural requirements, they met the Act's substantive mandates.
Specifically, Section II of this article discusses the scope of review
espoused in State Farm, under which an "agency must examine the
relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action
including a 'rational connection between the facts found and the
choice made.'"36 Superimposed on this analysis is a discussion of
Amoco Production Co., which demonstrates that, when applied to
NEPA, an agency's mere compliance with section 102(2)(C) 37 may be
insufficient. Rather, procedural compliance is adequate only if it is in
accord with NEPA's underlying substantive goals.
Section III of this article presents the various tenets that are via-
ble candidates for the environmental policy underlying NEPA's sub-
stantive goals. The four precepts analyzed are founded on two distinct
philosophies: utilitarianism and environmentalism. The former gives
rise to an environmental policy based on either exploitative or environ-
mentally-conscious utilitarianism, and the latter an environmental
policy stemming from either biocentrism or duty-based environ-
mentalism. The discussion of these various principles is necessary be-
cause it establishes a base against which NEPA's statutory language
31. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462
U.S. 87, 97 (1983); accord Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444
U.S. 223, 227 (1980).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1982), discussed infra Section IV.
33. See infra notes 84, 168-89 and accompanying text.
34. 463 U.S. 29 (1983); see generally Shapiro & Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the
Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for
Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 410-11.
35. - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1396 (1987).
36. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168
(1962)); accord Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 105 (1983).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982).
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and its legislative history can be evaluated. This discussion further
demonstrates that only an environmental policy founded on duty-
based environmentalism can protect Alaska's physical and biological
elements from unnecessary degradation and ill-conceived
development.
Section IV of this article examines NEPA's substantive goals by
reviewing the Act's structure, language, and legislative history. When
viewed in light of the characteristics of the four tenets discussed in
Section III, the national environmental policy enacted by Congress, as
embodied in section 101 of NEPA, 38 is one founded on duty-based
environmentalism.
Section V of this article discusses NEPA's operation, as reflected
(1) in the interpretative regulations promulgated by the Council on
Environmental Quality ("CEQ") to provide guidance to federal agen-
cies engaged in the completion of an EIS,39 and (2) by the Supreme
Court in Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.40 This discussion illustrates the fundamental conflict be-
tween the regulations promulgated by the CEQ and the Court's inter-
pretation of NEPA. The CEQ recognizes: (1) the importance of
NEPA's substantive mandate; and (2) the precept underlying NEPA's
espoused environmental policy as being duty-based environmentalism,
as defined by this author. In contrast, the Court all but ignores
NEPA's substantive goals and, to the extent substantive goals are
taken into account, considers NEPA's mandate to be based on envi-
ronmentally-conscious utilitarianism, as defined by this author. Sec-
tion V then discusses how the Court's decision in Baltimore Gas would
have differed had NEPA's substantive goals provided the base upon
which the adequacy of the agency's compliance with NEPA had been
measured. The Court's decision would have differed dramatically.
Finally, Section VI of this article concludes that if the Amoco Pro-
duction Co. Court's method of statutory construction and the State
Farm Court's scope of review are employed, then Baltimore Gas is no
longer a sound decision. Furthermore, the Court's and the Ninth Cir-
cuit's view that NEPA is "essentially procedural" is erroneous. The
impact of such a shift would be dramatic, and it would better fulfill
NEPA's substantive goals. Consequently, NEPA would better serve
as an environmental policy protecting and enhancing the integrity of
Alaska's natural endowment.
38. Id. § 4331.
39. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1-1508.28 (1987).
40. 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
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II. SCOPE OF REVIEW AND PROCEDURAL VERSUS
SUBSTANTIVE COMPLIANCE
A. Scope of Review
The scope of review used by a court when considering the validity
of an administrative agency's action is extremely important to the ulti-
mate resolution of a challenge to the adequacy of an agency's action.
In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Au-
tomobile Insurance Co.,41 the United States Supreme Court rejected an
extremely deferential approach under the arbitrary and capricious
standard of review and adopted what has been labeled "rationalism,"
or the "rationalist model of judicial review." 42 As explained by
Professors Sidney Shapiro and Richard Levy, under this standard of
review (a form of "hard look" review), agencies must "give a 'reasoned
elaboration' demonstrating that their decisions serve the statutory
ends for which they were created. '43 The rational relationship be-
tween an agency's decision and its statutory mandate, however, is not
"equivalent to the 'minimum rationality a statute must bear in order
to withstand analysis under the Due Process Clause.' "44 Instead, as
41. 463 U.S. 29, 43-51 (1983).
42. The "rationalist model of judicial review," as described by Professors Sidney
Shapiro and Richard Levy, represents a departure by the Court and the lower federal
courts from review models that provided agency decisions with substantial deference,
namely "structuralism" and "proceduralism." See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 34, at
397.
Initially, under "the 'structuralist' model of judicial review," the focus of review
was "on the constitutional limits to the structure of government." Id. at 397, 398-404,
414-16. As Shapiro and Levy explain, however, this review has been limited to the use
of "statutory interpretation to ensure that agency action is within the scope of its
authority." Id. at 401 (citing Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S.
361 (1986)).
With the decline in "structuralism" the authors observe that the Court adopted a
"proceduralist" model of review. Under this model, the courts based their review of
agency actions on "procedural fairness." Id. at 397, 404-10, 416-22. In Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 558 (1978), the Court held that reviewing courts could not require an agency to
emplace procedures that surpassed those imposed by the statute or the Constitution.
Thus, in Vermont Yankee the Court rendered proceduralism impotent as an effective
model of review. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 34, at 420. In its place, the Court,
followed by the lower federal courts, has turned to a "rationalist model of judicial
review." Id. at 389, 410-13, 422-25, discussed infra notes 43-45,'51 and accompanying
text.
43. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 34, at 412.
44. Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 2101, 2112 (1986);
accord Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
n.9 (1983).
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the Court explained in State Farm, "the agency must examine the rele-
vant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action in-
cluding a 'rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made.' -145
The courts are less deferential to agency actions under "rational-
ism" than they were under other forms of review. 46 Nevertheless, it
does not necessarily follow that an agency's compliance with NEPA's
procedural requirements would be insufficient. Particularly, given the
Court's interpretation that NEPA is "essentially procedural, '47 it
would appear that the "hard look" required by State Farm would in-
volve a procedural review only. This view seems to be the one em-
ployed by the Court in Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,48 which is discussed in Section V of
this article. Nevertheless, such a view cannot be reconciled with the
Court's recent decision in Amoco Production Co. v. Village of
Gambell. 49 The Court's decision in Amoco Production Co. would seem
to suggest that NEPA's section 102 procedural requirements are sec-
ondary to its section 101 substantive goals, or at least, that the ade-
quacy of an EIS or an administrator's action pursuant to an EIS
should not be determined by mere compliance with the procedural re-
quirements of section 102, but also should be measured against the
satisfaction of section 101's broad goals.
Although the Court's decision in Amoco Production Co. does not
involve an application of the arbitrary and capricious standard of re-
view, the Court's interpretation of ANILCA's structure and purpose
will affect subsequent application of the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard. For example, to satisfy the State Farm standard an agency must
45. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
46. See supra note 42.
47. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227
(1980) (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)).
48. 462 U.S. 87 (1983); see also Note, The Vermont Yankee Line: A Hard Look
Becomes a Passing Glance, 19 NEW ENG. L. REV. 837, 860-65 (1984). But see Sha-
piro & Levy, supra note 34, at 432 n.215 (Baltimore Gas does not undermine the
heightened level of scrutiny underlying "rationalism," because the Court "reversed a
court of appeals decision which focused not on the adequacy of the reasons supporting
an agency decision, but rather on the wisdom of that decision itself."); Weinstein,
Substantive Review Under NEPA After Vermont Yankee IV, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV.
837, 867-83 (1985) (interprets Baltimore Gas to acknowledge NEPA's substantive
mandate and to permit a reviewing court to enforce NEPA's substantive goals).
49. - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1396 (1987).
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demonstrate that its action pursuant to an ANILCA section 810 sig-
nificant restriction study5° is in accord with the statutory mandate,
that is, ANILCA's underlying substantive goals. This interpretation
better fulfills the objectives of the "rationalist model" of review and
also comports with Shapiro and Levy's observation that "the proper
role of statutory interpretation under rationalism is to identify the
value choice embodied in a statute. Identification of values obviously
must occur if judicial review is to ensure a rational relationship be-
tween agency action and the statutory objectives." 51 As demonstrated
below, because of the similarities between section 102 of NEPA and
section 810 of ANILCA, NEPA should be construed in a similar
manner.
B. Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell
In Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambel152 the Court con-
fronted the issue of whether the Secretary of the Interior should be
enjoined from selling oil and gas exploration leases because he had
failed to comply with the procedural mandate of ANILCA section
810.53 In denying injunctive relief, the Court found the case to be
indistinguishable from Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo. 5 4 In Romero-
Barcelo, the Court held that the Navy's failure to obtain a National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit prior to discharging
ordnances, as required under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
("FWPCA"),55 did not warrant the automatic issuance of injunctive
relief.5 6 Instead, the Romero-Barcelo, Court found that the FWPCA
did not preclude the courts from exercising equitable discretion in de-
termining whether an injunction should be granted.5 7 In both deci-
sions the Court found that injunction relief was unnecessary because
the agencies' procedural violations did not contravene the substantive
goals of the statutes involved.5 8
50. An ANILCA section 810 significant restriction study is the device employed
by agencies to comply with the requirements of section 810. 16 U.S.C. § 3120 (1982).
These studies can be analogized to the EIS's prepared by agencies in an effort to com-
ply with section 102 of NEPA.
51. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 34, at 434.
52. - U.S. _ 107 S. Ct. 1396 (1987).
53. Id. at 1399 (construing ANILCA § 810, 16 U.S.C. § 3120 (1982)).
54. Amoco Production Co., - U.S. at -, 107 S. Ct. at 1402-03 (applying Wein-
berger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982)).
55. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1323(a) (1982).
56. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 320.
57. Id.
58. See Amoco Production Co., - U.S. at -, 107 S. Ct. at 1403; Romero-Barcelo,
456 U.S. at 314-15.
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Amoco Production Co. is particularly probative due to the similar-
ities between section 810(a) of ANILCA 59 and section 102(2)(C) of
NEPA. 60 Section 810 of ANILCA provides in part:
(a) Factors considered; requirements
In determining whether to withdraw, reserve, lease, or other-
wise permit the use, occupancy, or disposition of public lands ....
the head of the Federal agency having primary jurisdiction over
such lands .. shall evaluate the effect of such use, occupancy, or
disposition on subsistence uses and needs, the availability of other
lands ... and other alternatives which would reduce or eliminate
the use, occupancy, or disposition of public lands needed for subsis-
tence purposes. No such withdrawal, reservation, lease or other use,
occupancy, or disposition of such lands which would significantly re-
strict subsistence uses shall be effected until the head of such Federal
agency -
(1) gives notice to the appropriate State agency and the ap-
propriate local committees and regional councils... ;
(2) gives notice of, and holds, a hearing in the vicinity of the
area involved; and
(3) determines that (A) such a significant restriction of sub-
sistence uses is necessary, consistent with sound management
principles for the utilization of the public lands, (B) the pro-
posed activity will involve the minimal amount of public lands
necessary to accomplish the purposes of such use, occupancy,
or other disposition, and (C) reasonable steps will be taken to
minimize adverse impacts upon subsistence uses and resources
resulting from such actions.
(d) Management or disposal of lands
After compliance with the procedural requirements of this sec-
tion and the other applicable law, the head of the appropriate Fed-
eral agency may manage or dispose of public lands under his
primary jurisdiction for any of those uses or purposes authorized by
this Act or other law. [61l
In comparison, section 102 of NEPA provides in part that:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possi-
ble: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United
States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the
policies set forth in this chapter,[621 and (2) all agencies of the Fed-
eral Government shall -
59. 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a) (1982).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982).
61. 16 U.S.C. § 3120 (1982) (emphasis added).
62. With this language, Congress explicitly intended to incorporate the substan-
tive goals of section 101 into the 102 procedural process. That is, Congress intended
section 102 to be the implementing mechanism for the national environmental policy
espoused by section 101. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (1987) (CEQ
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(C) include in every recommendation or report on pro-
posals for legislation and other major Federal actions signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a
detailed statement by the responsible official on -
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed
action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot
be avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses
of man's environment and the maintenance and en-
hancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments
of resources which would be involved in the proposed
action should it be implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal
official shall consult with and obtain comments of any Federal
agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with
respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such
statement and the comments and views of the appropriate Fed-
eral, State, and local agencies.., shall be made available to the
President, the Council on Environmental Quality and to the
public... and shall accompany the proposal through the...
agency review processes.
(E) study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives
to recommended courses of action in any proposal which in-
volves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of avail-
able resources; ... 63
The structure of these two statutes is similar in that, if the opera-
tive language of the acts is triggered, 64 both acts require the responsi-
ble agency or governmental entity to fulfill the procedural mandate
prior to undertaking the proposed federal action. Congress' use of
"shall" in ANILCA section 810 and NEPA section 102 indicates that
mandatory EIS guidelines), discussed infra notes 189-200 and accompanying text; An-
drews, Agency Responses to NEPA: A Comparison and Implications, 16 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 301, 301-02 (1976); Liebesman, The Council on Environmental Quality's
Regulations to Implement the National Environmental Policy Act - Will They Further
NEPA's Substantive Mandate?, 10 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 50,039, 50,039-40;
Peterson, An Analysis of Title I of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 50,035, 50,040 (1971); Note, Putting Bite in NEPA's
Bark: New Council on Environmental Quality Regulations For the Preparation of Envi-
ronmental Impact Statements, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 367, 367-68 (1980).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982) (emphasis added).
64. ANILCA's procedural requirements attach when proposed federal action will
"significantly restrict subsistence uses." 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a) (1982). In comparison,
NEPA's procedural requirements apply when planned federal action is deemed to be
"major Federal action[ ] significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(1982).
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it intended the procedural requirements of these Acts to be nondiscre-
tionary.65 Furthermore, Congress structured section 810 so that the
head of an administrative agency "shall" first comply with the proce-
dural scheme of ANILCA, and, having complied with the procedures,
he "may" use his discretion to "manage or dispose of public lands."'66
It contemplated that the head of the administrative agency would em-
ploy his discretionary powers in subsistence-related decisions only af-
ter complying with the procedural scheme Congress emplaced to
"protect and provide the opportunity for continued subsistence uses
on the public lands by Native and non-Native rural residents."' 67 Simi-
larly, NEPA's procedural mandate, contained within section 102, re-
quires the agency involved to prepare an EIS prior to proceeding with
any "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment. ' 68 Procedural compliance under NEPA is non-
discretionary, and only after such requirements are fulfilled may the
agency involved proceed with the proposed action.69
65. As explained by the Supreme Court in Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935),
"shall" is "the language of command." Id. at 493. Accordingly, Congress intended
through section 810 of ANILCA to provide rural Alaskans an opportunity to partici-
pate in decisions affecting subsistence uses. Absent section 810, the agencies could
have listened to the rural Alaskans had they so chosen, but they had not, as illustrated
by the Secretary's and the State's failure to protect subsistence uses as Congress had
demanded in the ANCSA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). This
neglect, as explained by Congressman Udall, one of the principal authors and support-
ers of ANILCA, was a major impetus for the enactment of the subsistence subchapter
containing section 810. See 125 CONG. REc. 9,904 (1979) (quoting H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 37, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 2247, 2250). Similarly, section 102 of NEPA - its "action forcing" provisions
- ensures the implementation of NEPA's substantive goals. See cases cited supra
note 6; supra note 62 and accompanying text. Thus, it is clear that Congress intended
to leave the agencies no discretion when it used "shall" in ANILCA section 810 and
NEPA section 102.
66. 16 U.S.C. § 3120 (1982).
67. Id. § 3111(4). Congress explained in its declaration and findings:
the national interest in the ... continuation of the opportunity for a subsis-
tence way of life by residents of rural Alaska require[s] that an administra-
tive structure be established for the purpose of enabling rural residents who
have personal knowledge of local conditions and requirements to have a
meaningful role in the management of... subsistence uses on the public
lands in Alaska.
Id. § 3111(5). Congress did not intend for ANILCA to preserve all subsistence uses.
Although the statute does not define the "opportunity for" qualification of subsistence
uses, its meaning is reflected in ANILCA's purpose: "This act does not, however,
attempt to perpetuate [subsistence] lifestyle[s] .... Rather, the act would merely at-
tempt to allow the Native people to decide for themselves the rate at which accultura-
tion will take place." H.R. REP. No. 1045, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 76 (1978).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982).
69. See cases cited supra note 6.
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Despite the nondiscretionary nature of Congress' procedural
mandate, the Court held that section 810 of ANILCA does not affect
the courts' ability to invoke the traditional balancing test when deter-
mining whether to issue injunctive relief for a substantial procedural
violation of section 810(a).70 Therefore, upon balancing the interests,
the Court found that the Secretary's failure to comply with section 810
of ANILCA did not warrant an injunction.71
In light of Congress' nondiscretionary procedural mandate, it
would at first blush seem that such a holding abridges the separation
of powers doctrine,72 which in the context of NEPA litigation has led
the Court to explain that "once an agency has made a decision subject
to NEPA's procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to
insure that the agency has considered the environmental conse-
quences; it cannot 'interject itself within the area of discretion of the
executive as to the choice of the action to be taken.' -73 As it did in
Romero-Barcelo, however, the Court based its holding on an interpre-
tation of the statute that skirts the separation of powers dilemma and
conforms with the use and interpretation of statutory mandates under
the "rationalist" model of review. 74 The Court explained that "[l]ike
the First Circuit in Romero-Barcelo, the Ninth Circuit erroneously fo-
cused on the statutory procedure rather than on the underlying sub-
stantive policy the process was designed to effect - preservation of
subsistence resources."'7 5 The Court based its holding on its determi-
nation that the procedural requirements of section 810(a) are
subordinate to its underlying substantive policy;76 therefore, because
the Secretary's action "did not undermine the [substantive] policy" of
70. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1396, 1403-05
(1987). The Court explained that the Ninth Circuit's presumption favoring injunctive
relief "is contrary to traditional equitable principles and has no basis in ANILCA."
Id. The United States District Court for the District of Alaska in Sierra Club v. Pen-
fold, 664 F. Supp. 1299, 1305-07 (D. Alaska 1987), applied this aspect of the Amoco
Production Co. decision to determine whether to issue an injunction for a violation of
NEPA section 102(2)(C). See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
71. Amoco Production Co., - U.S. at -, 107 S. Ct. at 1403-05.
72. See Note, Preliminary Injunctions as Relief for Substantial Procedural Viola-
tions of Environmental Statutes: Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 4
ALASKA L. REV. 105, 117-31, 148-51 (1987).
73. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28
(1980) (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976)).
74. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 34, at 433-34, discussed supra at note 51 and
accompanying text.
75. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1396, 1403
(1987).
76. Id.
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ANILCA,77 injunctive relief was not warranted for the violation of
ANILCA's mandatory procedures. 78
The Court's determination that the Ninth Circuit erred in
"focus[ing] on the statutory procedure rather than on the underlying
substantive policy the process was designed to effect" 79 could dramati-
cally affect the implementation of section 102 of NEPA. Because of
the structure and importance of ANILCA's procedural mandate, it is
difficult to imagine a statute for which the nondiscretionary proce-
dures can be construed to be primary and not subordinate to the un-
derlying substantive purpose.8 0 Furthermore, as demonstrated above,
the procedural mandates embodied in section 102 of NEPA and sec-
tion 810 of ANILCA are similar.8'
ANILCA's and NEPA's underlying substantive goals are similar
too: "The purpose of ANILCA § 810," as explained by the Court, "is
to protect Alaskan subsistence resources from unnecessary destruc-
tion"; 82 and, as explained by the Court in Kleppe v. Sierra Club,83
"NEPA announced a national policy of environmental protection
.... 84 Both statutes were enacted to protect a threatened entity:
ANILCA to protect subsistence resources, and NEPA to protect the
environment. Thus, a case can be made that the Court's determina-
tions in Amoco Production Co. and Romero-Barcelo that a reviewing
court should consider procedural compliance, or lack thereof, to be
secondary to the achievement of ANILCA's and the FWPCA's sub-
stantive goals, should be extended to NEPA litigation.
In Sierra Club v. Penfold, s5 the United States District Court for
the District of Alaska recently applied the injunction test enunciated
in Amoco Production Co. 86 to determine whether the Bureau of Land
Management ("BLM") should be enjoined from approving certain
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1405.
79. Id.
80. See Note, supra note 72, at 117-31.
81. See supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text. The Court, however, has never
decided whether and to what extent NEPA affects a court's ability to invoke the tradi-
tional equitable balancing test in deciding whether to grant or deny injunctive relief
for a substantial procedural violation of section 102(2)(C).
82. Amoco Production Co., - U.S. at ., 107 S. Ct. at 1403 (emphasis added).
83. 427 U.S. 390 (1976) (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 409 (emphasis added); accord 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) (1987), discussed
infra note 191 and accompanying text; see also Liebesman, supra note 62, at 50,039;
Peterson, supra note 62, at 50,035; Strohbehn, supra note 13, at 104 ("NEPA's sub-
stantive mandate [is] to preserve and enhance the environment to the fullest extent
possible.").
85. 664 F. Supp. 1299, 1305-06 (D. Alaska 1987).
86. - U.S. at , 107 S. Ct. at 1403-05, discussed supra notes 70-71 and accompa-
nying text.
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placer mining operations. Injunctive relief was sought because the
BLM had failed to prepare an EIS addressing the cumulative impact
of the mining activities. In granting delayed injunctive relief, the court
balanced the equities, as required in Amoco Production Co. for a viola-
tion of section 810 of ANILCA.87 The court's application of the bal-
ancing test is important because it represents a dramatic departure
from the injunction test generally applied in the Ninth Circuit for such
violations of NEPA. The court did not recognize the usual presump-
tion favoring the issuance of a preliminary injunction upon the show-
ing of a probable violation of NEPA section 102.88 This wholesale
adoption of the injunction rule applied in Amoco Production Co. fur-
ther suggests that, at least in the eyes of the Alaska District Court,
ANILCA's and NEPA's procedural mandates are similar and thereby
warrant analogous injunction standards.
Additional evidence of the Supreme Court's willingness to recon-
sider NEPA in a manner that would elevate the importance of its sub-
stantive goals is the Court's statement that:
Environmental injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately rem-
edied by money damages and is often permanent or at least of long
duration, i.e., irreparable. If such injury is sufficiently likely, there-
fore, the balance of harms will usually favor the issuance of an in-
junction to protect the environment. 89
This observation of the Court seems to reflect a view that, in most
cases in which a proposed action will injure the environment, an in-
junction is warranted because environmental considerations will out-
weigh other factors. Such a view echoes the substantive goals of
NEPA and, therefore, could be construed as further evidence that,
given the opportunity, the Court would emphasize NEPA's substan-
tive goals and hold that environmental harm, because it is often "ir-
reparable," should be given priority over other factors.
The above analysis demonstrates that the Court's decisions in
State Farm and Amoco Production Co. provide a basis upon which to
view NEPA as not "essentially procedural" but rather essentially sub-
stantive. That is, compliance with section 102 should only be ade-
quate if it is in accord with NEPA's substantive goals contained in
87. 664 F. Supp. at 1305-06.
88. Id. But see Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1250 (9th Cir.
1984) ("Irreparable damage is presumed when an agency fails to evaluate thoroughly
the environmental impact of proposed action. Only in a rare circumstance may a
court refuse to issue an injunction when it finds a NEPA violation." (citation and
footnote omitted)); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323, 330 (9th Cir.
1975); California v. Bergland, 483 F. Supp. 465, 498-99 (E.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, both on other grounds, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Note,
supra note 72, at 134-36.
89. Amoco Production Co., - U.S. at -, 107 S. Ct. at 1404.
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section 101. Such a shift would significantly alter the manner in which
courts review the adequacy of an agency's compliance with section 102
of NEPA. In the Ninth Circuit, for instance, the "rule of reason," 90
which is invoked as the appropriate standard of review, must be re-
jected because it is premised on NEPA being "essentially proce-
dural."91 Therefore, the arbitrary and capricious standard, as applied
by the Court in State Farm, would be the appropriate standard of re-
view for considering (1) the adequacy of an EIS, and (2) the lawfulness
of an administrator's action pursuant to an EIS.
Although affecting the scope and focus of judicial review, the real
impact of such a shift in emphasis favoring NEPA's substantive goals
will depend on the nature of these goals. To understand fully and
evaluate this national environmental policy, however, the basic tenets
underlying such a policy must be considered; only then can the magni-
tude of Congress' broad sweeping goals contained in section 101 of
NEPA be appreciated.
III. THE TENET UPON WHICH NEPA's SUBSTANTIVE GOALS
ARE FOUNDED
In response to its recognition that man's activities have significant
environmental impacts, Congress enacted a national environmental
policy: section 101 of NEPA.92 Two philosophical theories provide
viable alternatives upon which to found NEPA's national environmen-
tal policy: utilitarianism and environmentalism. The impact of the en-
vironmental policy will dramatically differ depending upon which
tenet is accepted. A policy based on a form of utilitarianism will favor
development over environmental protection, whereas, a policy
founded on a form of environmentalism will encourage environmental
protection.
A. Utilitarianism
Self interest provides the foundation for utilitarian philosophy.93
Utilitarian philosophy in turn supports two distinct environmental
policies. The first, exploitative utilitarianism, is based on the belief
90. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
91. See Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677, 692 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc), discussed
supra note 22.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1982).
93. For a general discussion of utilitarianism and the principles upon which it is
based, see Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in
THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, JAMES MILL & JOHN STUART
MILL 1, 7-12 (P. Wheelwright ed. 1935); Mill, Utilitarianism, in THE SELECTED
WRITINGS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, JAMES MILL & JOHN STUART MILL 397, 403-26
(P. Wheelwright ed. 1935).
19881
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
that man should use and consume the earth's resources as quickly as
possible, so long as exploitation is in man's or an individual's present
best interest. In other words, all decisions are economic, self interest-
based, with the interests of future generations heavily discounted.
Under the second view, environmentally-conscious utilitarianism, the
environment is considered an entity that must be managed in order to
maximize its productivity. Hence, although decisions are founded on
economic self interest, the future and alternative resource uses or val-
ues are an integral factor in the present allocation and use of a
resource.
1. Exploitative Utilitarianism. Environmental policy based on
exploitative utilitarianism either is founded on: (1) a total disregard
for the environment; or (2) an ignorant view that either the earth's
resources are boundless, with man's only physical limit being himself,
or technological growth is exponential and benign. The first view -
environmental indifference - is best illustrated by the practices of the
"shake-makers. ' 94 A shake-maker, as described by environmentalist
John Muir, would find a stand of virgin pine, quickly build a shanty,
and then proceed to level the forest in order to obtain the bottom ten
to twenty feet of trees 250 feet tall. The shake-maker would cut until
the stand of pine was exhausted and then move on to another virgin
stand. Muir noted that the shake-makers "[bought] no land, [paid] no
taxes, dwell[ed] in paradise with no forbidding angel either from
Washington or from heaven. Every one of the frail shake shanties
[was] a center of destruction .... -95 Furthermore, he explained that
all shake-makers "preferred shake business, until something more
profitable and as sure could be found, with equal comfort and indepen-
dence."'96 Individuals such as the shake-makers, whose motivations
are exclusively self interest-based, do not contemplate, hence make no
attempt to justify, the environmental consequences of their actions.
Individuals within the second group share the same self interest-
based motivations as the shake-makers but attempt to justify their ac-
tions. Justification, however, lies on the tenuous foundation that there
is a technological solution for every conceivable resource or environ-
mental problem. The epitomy of this philosophy is captured in Profes-
sor Julian Simon's statement: "[An increased need for resources
usually leaves us with a permanently greater capacity to get them, be-
cause we gain knowledge in the process. And there is no meaningful
physical limit - even the commonly mentioned weight of the earth -
94. J. MUIR, OUR NATIONAL PARKS 353-65 (1981).
95. Id. at 356.
96. Id. at 354.
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to our capacity to keep growing forever."'97 Under this view, it follows
that the only real problem with the present state of the environment is
the failure to exploit fully the earth's resources.
Simon applies this philosophy to population growth and con-
cludes that the only population problem lies in the attempt to control
and curb population growth. Under Simon's theory, attempts to con-
trol population growth impede man's progress and cultural develop-
ment because:
The main fuel to speed our progress is our stock of knowledge, and
the brake is our lack of imagination. The ultimate resource is peo-
ple - skilled, spirited, and hopeful people who will exert their wills
and imaginations for their own benefit, and so, inevitably, for the
benefit of us all. 98
Simon's thesis is founded on the assumption that each additional
person will contribute positively to man's progress. Simon and other
technological optimists, however, fail to address the fact that as re-
sources become scarcer and mere existence becomes a paramount is-
sue, as is the situation in the parts of the world in which starvation and
disease are the rule and not the exception, the number of "skilled, spir-
ited, and hopeful people who will exert their wills and imaginations for
their own benefit" will most likely decline.
Furthermore, the success of technological optimism is founded on
the beliefs that new technology is benign and political institutions will
mature exponentially, as is necessary to maximize the new technolo-
gies.99 Political institutions, unfortunately, are primarily reactive in
nature I00 and, therefore, cannot keep pace with exponential technolog-
ical growth. Nuclear power represents an example of governmental
and societal inability to mature at a rate necessary to ensure the benign
use of technological growth. Although nuclear power has many bene-
ficial uses, these applications have been overshadowed by its weapon
and fuel capabilities. The first presents mankind with the insecurity of
the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, threat
of nuclear terrorism, and the potential of a nuclear holocaust., ° The
second leaves man with high-level radioactive wastes for which tech-
nology has not provided a method of safe, long-term disposal. These
97. J. SIMON, THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE 346 (1981); accord, No Small Differ-
ence of Opinion, WORLD ENVIRONMENT NEWSLETTER, Aug. 15, 1972, at 30-31 (in
his comments concerning the exponential growth of knowledge, Lord Zuckerman ex-
plained that "the tree of knowledge will go on growing endlessly"), quoted in W.
OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY 116 (1977).
98. J. SIMON, supra note 97, at 348 (emphasis added).
99. See, e.g., Krier & Gillette, The Un-Easy Case for Technological Optimism, 84
MICH. L. REV. 405, 413-29 (1985).
100. Id. at 428.
101. See generally J. SCHELL, FATE OF THE EARTH (1982).
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two important technological dilemmas are not the product of the tech-
nology itself, but rather, political and societal inability to mature to a
level necessary to harness responsibly the technology.
Institutional inability to keep pace with technology and resource-
related dilemmas and their subsequent impacts are further illustrated
by Professor Garrett Hardin's explanation of the tragedy of the com-
mons 02 and is most clearly presented in model two of Professor Ken-
neth Boulding's mesa analysis, which illustrates the dilemma through
population growth.10 3 Boulding analogizes the present world popula-
tion to that of a population atop a "pretty crowded mesa surrounded
on all sides by cliffs," in which the rich occupy the center of the mesa
and are protected by a fence from the poor who occupy the remainder
of the mesa. Provided no measures are taken to curb population and
resource consumption on the mesa, Boulding asserts that "before the
poor push each other off the edge, they [will] pull down the fence,
invade the preserve of the rich, and the whole mesa becomes one great
mass of misery and poverty."' 1 4
Boulding's example clearly demonstrates the physical and polit-
ical flaws inherent in the utilitarian philosophy espoused by Simon and
embodied in technological optimism. Simply stated, the mesa, like our
finite world, cannot grow and the impoverished - a group that will
enlarge as resources become scarcer and population increases - will
not maintain the status quo either by leaping from the mesa or by
developing scientific and technological means capable of sustaining
102. Hardin invokes the dilemma of exponential population growth within a finite
world to suggest that it is but one example of a class of "no technical solution
problems." Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, in MANAGING THE COMMONS 16,
17 (G. Hardin & J. Baden eds. 1977). Such problems have neither scientific nor tech-
nological solutions. Rather, Hardin explains that the solutions to these problems are
social/institutional ones founded on the concept of "mutual coercion" - coercion
that is "mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people affected." Id. at 27. Har-
din suggests that if a social solution is not discovered, then a tragedy of the commons
is certain. Id. at 20-21. The commons are those resources for which use and access are
unrestricted - private property rights are nonexistent. The tragedy, therefore, un-
folds because the commons are finite; thus, unrestrained use degrades the resource.
Individual users, however, will not reduce their use because, absent coercion, it is
unlikely that all users will similarly modify their actions. Hence, for example, in a
situation in which the commons is a defined unit of grazing land, Hardin explains
that:
Each man is locked in a system that compels him to increase his herd with-
out limit - in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which
all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in
the freedom of the commons. Freedom in the commons brings ruin to all.
Id. at 20.
103. Boulding, Commons and Community: The Idea of a Public, in MANAGING
THE COMMONS 280, 291 (G. Hardin & J. Baden eds. 1977).
104. Id. at 291.
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unlimited growth. Furthermore, even if the technology is developed,
it is unlikely that political institutions will adapt quickly enough to
employ that technology responsibly and in a benign fashion. Thus, the
only solution available for the mass of underprivileged of a utilitarian-
based society who are incapable of solving their dilemma scientifically
or technologically (because they lack the adequate education and more
importantly because their lives are consumed in a day-to-day struggle
to exist) is to take from the rich, thereby destroying the status quo
through political and social strife. Hence, if the goals of an environ-
mental policy are either for man to develop a harmonious relationship
with the environment or to ensure that environmental values are con-
sidered, then exploitative utilitarianism is inept. 105
2. Environmentally-Conscious Utilitarianism. Historically, the
Conservation movement, under Gifford Pinchot,10 6 provides the best
example of this form of utilitarianism. Conservation, as defined by
Pinchot, was based on management of the earth's resources in such a
way as to maximize the utility of the present generation. Specifically,
"[c]onservation mean[t] the greatest good to the greatest number for
the longest time."107 Three principles provided the core of this policy:
The first principle of conservation is development, the use of
the natural resources now existing on this continent for the benefit
of the people who live here now. There may be just as much waste
in neglecting the development and use of certain natural resources
as there is in their destruction....
[S]econd . . . conservation stands for the prevention of
waste....
[T]hird... natural resources must be developed and preserved
for the benefit of the many, and not merely for the profit of a
few .... 108
Although a major political force affecting all aspects of life during
the early 1900's,' 0 9 Conservation did not persist. The primary reason
for Conservation's short duration as a national ethic was the tenet's
inability to recognize value in unused or undeveloped lands. This fault
105. Furthermore, as Section IV demonstrates, exploitative utilitarianism is a tenet
that Congress did not consider to be the basis for the environmental policy enacted.
106. Gifford Pinchot, Chief of the Division of Forestry (1898-1905), Chief of the
Bureau of Forestry in the Department of Agriculture (1905-1910), was the driving
force behind the Conservation movement. The movement began as a philosophy by
which the national forests were to be managed (sustainable-yield management) and
under Theodore Roosevelt's presidency became a short-lived national ethic. See gen-
erally S. DANA & S. FAIRFAX, FOREST AND RANGE POLIcY 69-97 (1980); S. HAYS,
CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY 27-48, 122-27 (1980).
107. G. PINCHoT, THE FIGHT FOR CONSERVATION 48 (1910).
108. Id. at 42-46 (1910).
109. See S. DANA & S. FAIRFAX, supra note 106, at 69-97; S. HAYS, supra note
106, at 27-48, 122-27.
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provided a nucleus for the Preservation movement' 10 headed by John
Muir - a movement that Pinchot was unable to quash. The conflict
between Conservation and Preservation demonstrated the inherent
limitations of an environmental policy based on utilitarian principles:
the inability to recognize inherent value in non-productive land.
The failure of Conservation to become an enduring national envi-
ronmental ethic, however, did not eliminate environmental policy
based on utilitarian or benefit-cost (economic efficiency) principles.III
Currently, in the United States there is a resurgence of utilitarian-
based environmental policy. Illustrative of this point are two initia-
tives of the Reagan administration: (1) its attempts to weaken or elim-
inate various environmental statutes and regulatory programs;' 12 and
(2) its use of benefit-cost analysis as a policy rule, rather than as a tool
in administrative decisionmaking. I f3 The policy rule versus tool dis-
tinction is especially important because, when benefit-cost analysis is
used as a rule, decisions must mirror the results of a cost efficiency
determination; whereas when benefit-cost analysis is employed as a
tool, decisions must consider but are not bound by the benefit-cost
results.
The benefit-cost (economic efficiency) methodology in which
environmental costs and benefits are weighed against their non-
environmental counterparts1 14 either to determine the net present
110. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
111. Professor Alan Coddington views benefit-cost analysis as a "variant of Utilita-
rian philosophy," or, in other words, the "New Utilitarianism." Coddington, "Cost-
Benefit" as the New Utilitarianism, 42 POL. Q. 320 (1971). "Wealth maximization,"
as defined by Richard Posner, is another economic-based philosophy that can provide
the basis for an environmental policy founded on economic principles. See infra notes
124-25 and accompanying text.
112. See generally N. VIG & M. KRAFT, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE
1980's: REAGAN'S NEW AGENDA (1984).
113. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 at 431-34 (1982); Leonard & Zeckhauser, Cost-Benefit Analysis Applied to Risks:
Its Philosophy and Legitimacy, in VALUES AT RISK 31, 33 (D. Maclean ed. 1986)
("Cost-benefit analysis, which begins by totaling the gains and losses of each party, is
the appropriate way to determine which public decisions affecting risk levels would
gain the hypothetical consent of the citizenry. We know of no other mechanism for
making such choices that has an ethical underpinning.").
114. Professor David Copp explains that "there is a standard view about the asso-
ciated economic techniques and criteria" underlying cost-benefit methodology. Copp,
Morality, Reason, and Management Science: The Rationale of Cost-Benefit Analysis, in
ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 128, 130 (E. Paul, J. Paul & F. Miller eds. 1985). This
methodology requires:
All of the costs and benefits of a project, to all of the individual members of
the relevant society, are supposed to be taken into account, discounting fu-
ture costs and benefits, ideally at the rate of time preference of each person
concerned. The benefits of a project to an individual are, in principle, to be
valued at the maximum amount of money he would be willing to pay in
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value115 or the benefit-cost ratio 1 6 of a particular project - on the
surface at least - appears to encompass the Conservation/Preserva-
tion dispute. The benefit-cost methodology is based on the theory that
the intangible properties of wilderness and values of undeveloped
lands can be quantified and, therefore, can be weighed against the val-
ues associated with developing these lands and other relevant
nonenvironmental benefits and costs. Hence, the projects chosen pur-
port to maximize social welfare because only those projects are chosen
that either have the greatest net present value or benefit-cost ratios
equalling or exceeding one.1 17 The effectiveness of such a decision-
making rule as an environmental policy, however, is contingent upon
the adoption of two premises: (1) environmental values, such as clean
water or endangered species, are capable of quantification; and (2) an
appropriate method of valuation exists.
The assumption that environmental values are quantifiable
presumes that all environmental and resource problems are economic
rather than social or ethical problems.1 18 For example, as economist
Larry Ruff explains, the pollution dilemma facing a "rational society"
(one basing its environmental policy on cost efficiency) is not "between
clean air and dirty air, or between clear water and polluted water, but
rather between various levels of dirt and pollution." 119 Such a view of
pollution, however, would conflict with that held by an environ-
mentalist. Aldo Leopold, for example, believes that any amount of
pollution or similar activity that disturbs the "integrity, stability, and
beauty of the biotic community" is "wrong." 120
Additionally, within a "rational society" it is assumed that either
consumer value equals citizen value or no such distinction exists. Ben-
efit-cost and other "economic approaches to public policy may," as
Professor Mark Sagoff concedes, "purport to weigh both consumer
and citizen values." He asserts, however, that "we may, as citizens,
order to have the project go forward.... Ideally, all costs and benefits are to
be assigned a monetary value, positive or negative, and, in the simple case -
where there is no uncertainty and where all costs and benefits are expected
immediately - their values are added. The result is a measure of the ex-
pected net social gain or loss.
Id. (footnote and citations omitted).
115. Net present value is the sum of the discounted costs and benefits associated
with the project over its economic life.
116. Benefit-cost ratio equals the discounted value of a project's benefits divided by
the discounted value of its costs.
117. Copp, supra note 114, at 130-31.
118. Ruff, The Economic Common Sense of Pollution, in ECONOMICS OF THE EN-
VIRONMENT 41, 41-42 (R. Dorfman & N. Dorfman 2d ed. 1977).
119. Id. at 43.
120. A. LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 262 (1949), discussed infra notes
139, 141-44 and accompanying text.
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believe that certain public values or collective goals (e.g., that an inno-
cent person not be convicted) supersede the values that we pursue as
self-seeking individuals (e.g., security from crime). Moreover, we
might decide to sacrifice economic optimality for cleaner air and
water."1
21
Economists attempt to address Sagoff's concern by either as-
signing value to nonmarket goods or internalizing externalities, that is,
assigning values to "public wants or citizen preferences,"' 122 such as
the value of clean water or ensured survival of species that otherwise
lack value. Sagoff believes, however, that this effort "to measure the
convictions or values of citizens by pricing them as market externali-
ties confuses what the individual wants as an individual and what he
or she, as a citizen, believes is best for the community."' 123 This,
Sagoff asserts, is a categorical mistake, because self interest motivates
the consumer self; whereas community convictions - not individual
wants or preferences - motivate the citizen self. Consequently, any
attempt to place a value (willingness to pay) on a public good must
fail, because a community conviction cannot be measured in utilitarian
terms.
Economists disagree, however. Richard Posner, for instance,
would concur with Sagoff's conclusion that autonomy/consent - the
individual's ability to choose and to participate - is paramount. 124
But, if given the opportunity to choose, Posner maintains that an indi-
vidual will choose a society or policy that maximizes wealth. The
wealth of society, as defined by Posner, is "the aggregate satisfaction
of those preferences (the only ones that have ethical weight in a system
of wealth maximization) that are backed up by money, that is, that are
registered in a market."' 125 Hence, under Posner's view of society and
man (the view incorporated by a "rational society") the categorical
mistake is nonexistent, because both the consumer and citizen selves
(if such a distinction could even exist in Posner's view of society) are
driven by the need to maximize wealth.
Once it is established or accepted that environmental values are
quantifiable, then traditional benefit-cost analysis requires that mone-
tary value be assigned to all factors relevant to particular decisions or
policy questions. Quantifying public and private values, as Professor
R. H. Coase explains, enables society when "devising and choosing
121. Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1393,
1401 (1981).
122. Id. at 1403.
123. Id. at 1410.
124. Compare Sagoff, supra note 121, at 1414-16 with R. POSNER, THE ECONOM-
ICS OF JUSTICE 88-99 (1981).
125. R. POSNER, supra note 124, at 61.
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between social arrangements . . . [to] have regard for the total ef-
fect."' 2 6 The success of weighing all private and public benefits and
costs in attaining an "optimal arrangement of rights, and a greater
value of production which it would bring," is contingent upon
"costless market transactions."' 127 For Coase asserts that the value of
the right to pollute and the value of the right to be free from pollution
in a system without transaction costs are equal. Therefore, the initial
assignment of the rights is immaterial, and furthermore the market
would achieve an optimal arrangement of rights. 128 Nevertheless,
Coase admits the presence of transaction costs, which are "often ex-
tremely costly;' 1 29 therefore, the initial allocation of rights will affect
the efficiency of the economic system and the social arrangements.
Moreover, even if transaction costs are negligible or otherwise ac-
counted for, Coase's theory further assumes that value is uniform.
That is, one's asking and offering price must be equal. This assump-
tion is questionable. 30 For instance, Professor Duncan Kennedy
demonstrates that the monetary value assigned to either a tangible
(body of water) or intangible (solitude) entity will differ from one per-
son to another as well as for each individual depending on whether the
assignment of value is based on one's offering or asking price.131
In addition to these considerations, present value must be
weighed against future value and an appropriate discount rate must be
assigned. Inherent in this calculation is the question of whether the
present generation has any obligation to future generations to protect
and provide a clean environment or to preserve finite resources. Clas-
sic utilitarians would say no. Regardless of whether a duty exists, this
dilemma is particularly perplexing in the area of environmental policy
because: (1) many of nature's components have no present value,
much less a calculable future value; and (2) many environmental dis-
turbances caused by the present generation are not limited, but rather
will linger and perhaps worsen over time.
In determining whether environmentally-conscious utilitarianism
and its necessary assumptions provide an adequate tenet upon which
to anchor a national environmental policy, it is helpful to consider
how such a policy would operate. Professor David Ehrenfeld clearly
126. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 44 (1960).
127. Id. at 15-16.
128. Id. at 16.
129. Id. at 15.
130. Copp, supra note 114, at 133-35 (a person's willingness to pay and welfare
gain may vary depending on an individual's wealth, available information, and one's
willingness, or lack thereof, to sell at any price); Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REv. 387, 401-10 (1981); Krutilla,
Conservation Reconsidered, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 779-80 (1967).
131. Kennedy, supra note 130, at 401-10.
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illustrates the consequences of basing environmental policy on wealth
maximization or cost efficiency principles. 132 In assessing the risks in-
herent in assigning economic value to a marsh site, Ehrenfeld explains:
First, any competing use with a higher value, no matter how slight
the differential, would be entitled to priority in the use of the marsh
site. Because most competing uses are irreversible, a subsequent rel-
ative increase in value of marsh land would come too late ....
Second, values change ....
Third, the implication of the study is that both the valuable
and the valueless qualities of the tidal marsh are all known and
identified. Conversely, this means that those qualities of the salt
marsh that have not been assigned a conventional value are not very
important ....
Fourth .... quick profits from immediate exploitation, even to
the point of extinction of a resource, often are economically supe-
rior to long-term, sustained profits of the sort that might be gener-
ated by the intact resource .... In other words, finding a value for
some part of Nature is no guarantee that it will be rational for us to
preserve it - the reverse may hold. 133
Similarly, an environmental policy based on utilitarian principles
even environmentally-conscious utilitarianism - will not guaran-
tee that Alaska's physical and biological constituents will receive ap-
propriate consideration in development related decisions. Where cost
efficiency is invoked as a decisionmaking rule, the fragile ecosystems of
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, old growth timber in the Tongass
National Forest, pristine river systems adjacent to mineral rich forma-
tions, and wildlife living in areas sustaining mineral and petroleum
activities are just a few examples of Alaska's natural resources that
would fare no better than Ehrenfeld's marsh.
B. Environmentalism
In contrast to utilitarianism, environmentalism is founded on the
principle that man's relationship with nature must be a harmonious
one. From this precept, two forms of environmentalism have devel-
oped. One form, biocentrism, harbors the view that man is indistin-
guishable in kind from the other inhabitants of the earth. Under the
second form, duty-based environmentalism, man is not considered
equal to other species; rather, man is viewed as having an obligation to
preserve the environment and its inhabitants.
1. Biocentrism. An environmental policy based on a belief that
man is similar in kind to the earth's other inhabitants is philosoph-
ically the most harmonious and conceptually the simplest philosophy
132. D. EHRENFELD, THE ARROGANCE OF HUMANISM 177-211 (1978).
133. Id. at 201-02.
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upon which to base an environmental policy. Unfortunately, an envi-
ronmental policy founded on this philosophy is impractical and un-
realistic. This view, illustated in the writings of environmentalist
Henry Thoreau, 134 and ecologists Bill Devall and George Sessions,135
and embodied in an environmentally-conscious, subsistence-type lifes-
tyle, fails to accommodate man's dual nature - his thinking and
nonthinking selves. 136 Because of the marriage of technology and sci-
ence, man has developed his "self conscious and intelligent will,"'1 37 as
George Perkins Marsh labeled man's thinking self, over his nonthink-
ing, natural self in such a manner that precludes the two selves of man
from existing in harmony as they could in a subsistence-type existence.
In a subsistence-type lifestyle man's ability to alter nature on a re-
gional or global scale is limited; hence his actions, although differing in
kind in that they are products of a "self conscious and intelligent will,"
do not differ in degree from those of other inhabitants of the earth.
Thus, regardless of its intellectual appeal, biocentric philosophy is
unrealistic, mainly because it can only succeed if man is willing to
establish a "harmonious dynamic balance of humans-in-Nature,"' 138
thereby requiring him to accept a subsistence-type lifestyle similar to
that pursued by Thoreau. Such a commitment, absent a nuclear holo-
caust or other similar catastrophe divorcing science and technology, is
precluded by the development of man's thinking self. Therefore, to-
day a successful environmental policy cannot be based on a biocentric
philosophy.
134. H. THOREAU, WALDEN (J. Shanley ed. 1973).
135. Devall & Sessions, The Development of Natural Resources and the Integrity of
Nature, 6 ENVTL. ETHIcs 293 (1984).
136. See generally I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 327-67 (N. Smith trans.
1929) (Transcendental Dialectic, Book II, ch. I, The Paralogisms of Pure Reason);
Rolston, Can and Ought We to Follow Nature, I ENVTL. ETHICS 7, 12-30 (1979).
Upon observing that man's nature is dualistic, Professor Holmes Rolston III con-
cludes that man is not merely another creature inhabiting the earth. Thus, he explains
that because man is the only "animal[ ] with deliberate options and these options do
enable us to command nature, the more so with the advance of science," Rolston,
supra, at 14, and because human actions are "unnatural," id. at 15, man is, therefore,
a moral creature and cannot follow nature in an "imitative ethical sense." Id. at 16-19.
Nevertheless, Rolston concludes that we ought to follow nature in two capacities.
First, we should follow nature in an "axiological sense" because "[w]e find meanings
in wild things," id. at 24, and therefore "[w]e ought not destroy this integrity [of
nature], but rather preserve it and contemplate it, and in this sense our relations with
nature are moral," id. Second, we should follow nature in a "tutorial sense," because
"we have enormous amounts of nature programmed into us," id. at 26, and thus "our
optional conduct ought to be commensurately natural .... Our ethical life ought to
maintain for us a good natural fit in both an efficient and a moral sense," id. at 27.
137. G. MARSH, MAN AND NATURE 41 (1974).
138. Devall & Sessions, supra note 135, at 319.
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2. Duty-Based Environmentalism. Obligation serves as the foun-
dation for a duty-based environmental policy. Under this policy
man's relationship to nature is similar to a man-within-nature view in
that it embraces environmentalism - the demand that man's interac-
tion with nature be harmonious. But, unlike a biocentric philosophy
in which harmony exists because man is merely another species in its
natural state inhabiting the earth, under a duty-based view harmony is
present because, as environmentalist Aldo Leopold explains, "[a] thing
is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of
the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise." 139
Historically, Preservation, as promoted by Muir, and the Land
ethic, as described by Leopold, represent two examples of a duty-based
environmental ethic. The Preservation movement was founded on an
understanding that a need existed to use and manage resources, but
that "first priority" should be given to "preserving the finest land-
scapes of the public domain as temples unspoiled and intact." 40 Muir
believed that man had a duty to protect certain pristine environments
from the exploiters and managers.
The Land ethic, as described by Leopold, is dependent on man's
relationship to land evolving from one that is "strictly economic, en-
tailing privileges but not obligations,"' 141 to one that is ethical. Leo-
pold demonstrates the plausibility of such a transition by reminding us
that "social ethics ... a century ago" were "governed wholly by eco-
nomic self-interest,"'' 42 rather than by obligation or notions of "right
or wrong." The abolition of slavery in the United States, where slaves
were considered property and, as Leopold explains, "[tlhe disposal of
property was then, as now, a matter of expediency, not of right and
wrong,"' 143 represents a classic example of human relationships evolv-
ing from an economic, self interest base to an ethical base. Leopold,
therefore, believes that man can shed his property-based view of na-
ture for an ethically-based one in a manner similar to our transition
vis-A-vis human relationships. (In fact, Professors Eva and John
Hanks believe that NEPA meant to provide the basis for such an ethic
- an "ecological ethic.")144 The Land ethic requires a fundamental
value change, demanding that every decision affecting the environ-
ment be made in a manner that preserves man's harmonious relation-
ship with nature.
139. A. LEOPOLD, supra note 120, at 262.
140. S. UDALL, THE QUIET CRISIS 120 (1963); see also S. DANA & S. FAIRFAX,
supra note 106, at 45; S. HAYS, supra note 106, at 141-46.
141. A. LEOPOLD, supra note 120, at 238.
142. Id. at 245.
143. Id. at 237.
144. Hanks & Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 230, 268 (1970).
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Coupled with a duty to develop and maintain a harmonious rela-
tionship with nature is an obligation to provide future generations
with a clean and healthy environment. 45 The issues presented by
such an obligation are: (1) the extent of this obligation; and
(2) whether such an obligation is uniform for all future generations.
Professor Annette Baier attempts to address these two questions.
Concerning the nature of the obligation, she asserts:
Where we are in doubt whether a certain change for the worse is or
is not irreversible, it would seem the prudent thing to suppose the
worst .... Similarly with responsible thinking on behalf of future
people - we should not count on their finding ways to detoxify
what we are poisoning. The sacrifice required of us to stop the
poisoning seems much less than the burden placed on them if we bet
wrong on their ability to undo what we are doing.146
Baier does not contend, however, that the interests of all future gener-
ations should be considered equally. Instead, she explains that to peo-
ple in the near future 47 "we owe . . . responsible planning, planning
aimed at seeing not merely that they inherit basic resources 'as good'
as ours, but also the means to get 'enough' of the divisible exhaustible
goods we know they will need."' 48 Whereas, to "all future people" the
present generation is obligated "not knowingly to injure the common
human interests [future people] like all [people] have - interests in a
good earth and in a good tradition guiding us in living well on it with-
out destroying its hospitability to human life."1 49
An effective environmental policy based on obligations to the en-
vironment and to future generations cannot ignore, however, the fact
that many of man's actions are motivated by self interest. Hence, the
difficulty rests in developing a policy that can accommodate self inter-
est without compromising man's duty to maintain a harmonious rela-
tionship with nature and to fulfill his obligation to future generations.
145. But see, e.g., Baier, For the Sake of Future Generations, in EARTHBOUND 214,
220-25 (T. Regan ed. 1984). Baier presents and then refutes, id. at 231-34, the classic
argument against any obligation for future generations. The analysis against future
obligation is founded on the paradox that for a hypothetical future person to seek
redress for a wrong caused prior to his or her birth requires the future person to
maintain the claim that they would be better off not being born. For example, em-
ploying this logic, a person A born into slavery and whose father was captured in state
X and mother in state Z cannot assert that he has been wronged. To maintain such a
claim requires that A believe that nonexistence is superior to existing in his present
state, because, but for the enslavement of his parents, A would not exist.
146. Id. at 240.
147. Baier considers this group to include those future generations that are "close
enough in time to us for their particular needs and abilities to be foreseeable, and for
us to have control over how many of them there will be, what opportunities they will
have, what supply problems they will face." Id. at 242.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 243.
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Both Sagoff and Ehrenfeld confront this dilemma. Sagoff suggests that
man is comprised of both a consumer and a citizen self with the for-
mer being motivated by "desires or wants" and the latter by "opinions
or beliefs."' 150 Sagoff supports this view of our society by explaining
that many of our environmental laws such as the Endangered Species
Act' -5 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act' 52 cannot be jus-
tified using an economic efficiency analysis. (NEPA, too, could be ad-
ded to Sagoff's list.) Sagoff recognizes that "[o]ur environmental laws
illustrate that we are governed by legislatures, not by markets." 153
These laws are the products of citizen selves expressing community
convictions within an autonomous, democratic society. Although
under this view economic efficiency and markets cannot be used to
make policy decisions, Sagoff does recognize that benefit-cost analysis
"may play a useful role in supplementing or informing political deci-
sion making."' 154 It is a tool rather than a policymaking rule. 155
Ehrenfeld suggests a system that maintains the distinction be-
tween the citizen and consumer selves, as defined by Sagoff, while per-
mitting the limited use of benefit-cost analysis. His balancing scheme
satifies man's selfish needs without compromising man's obligation to
nature. Ehrenfeld asserts that "[s]elfishness, within bounds" or deci-
sions founded on utilitarian principles are "necessary."' 156 But, he
notes that when humanistic 57 and non-humanistic' 58 values conflict,
humanistic values must be set aside. Humanistic values should yield
to non-humanistic values because "[r]esource reasons for conservation
can be used if honest, but must always be presented together with the
non-humanistic reasons, and it should be made clear that the latter are
more important in every case."' 159
If NEPA were applied in a manner consistent with duty-based
environmentalism, it would provide an effective means of ensuring re-
sponsible use and protection of Alaska's unique physical and biologi-
cal endowment. NEPA's ability to serve as the basis for a Land or
ecological ethic, however, is contingent upon its (1) language and
150. Sagoff, supra note 121, at 1411, discussed supra notes 121-25 and accompany-
ing text.
151. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
152. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
153. Sagoff, supra note 121, at 1399.
154. Id. at 1409.
155. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
156. D. EHRENFELD, supra note 132, at 210.
157. A species' value to man.
158. A species' inherent, "unimpeachable right to continued existence." D.
EHRENFELD, supra note 132, at 207-08.
159. Id. at 210.
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structure and (2) administrative and judicial interpretations and
applications.
IV. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
NEPA is one of the most important, yet among the shortest and
simplest environmental statutes enacted. 160 It is "action forcing," 16'
but neither technology forcing 162 nor standard setting,' 63 as are other
major environmental statutes. In its brief history, however, NEPA
has dramatically affected governmental decisionmaking. 164 Before
NEPA's enactment, governmental management was principally based
on economic considerations. As Daniel Dreyfus and Professor Helen
Ingram observed, prior to NEPA:
An essential objective of government throughout the history of the
[United States] had been to promote economic growth. Early fron-
tier expansionism had been replaced by the progressive conservation
ethic of the 1900's, which espoused wise use of natural resources.
Sustained yield and public stewardship had replaced exploitation,
but the goal of management, both public and private, was still eco-
nomic gain. Even the preservationists of the 1950's and 1960's did
not challenge the ascendency of economics as it applied to most
issues. They simply maintained that some places had a very great
value which was difficult to quantify.
The idea incorporated in the policy statement of NEPA that
valuable economic opportunity might in some instances be foregone
160. Professor William Rodgers considers NEPA the "Sherman Act of environ-
mental law," W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 697 (1977), and in 1976, Richard
Liroff characterized NEPA as "the most sweeping environmental law ever enacted by
a United States Congress." R. LIROFF, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRON-
MENT: NEPA and its Aftermath 3 (1976).
161. S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 14, at 19-21 (1969) (section analysis
of section 102); accord Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1979); Kleppe v.
Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409-10 (1976).
162. Examples of technology forcing environmental statutes include section
301(b)(2)(A) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 131 1(b)(2)(A)
(1982) ("FWPCA") (best available technology requirements), section 301(k) of the
FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(k) (1982), and section 202(a)(3)(A)(i) of the Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i) (1982) ("CAA") (emission standards for new motor
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines).
163. Examples of standard setting environmental statutes include sections 108-9 of
the CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-09 (1982) (national primary and secondary ambient air
quality standards), and section 303 of the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1982) (water
quality standards and state implementation plans).
164. See generally W. RODGERS, supra note 160, at 704 ("[NEPA] is tectonic legis-
lation affecting relationships of governmental institutions in many subtle ways."); An-
drews, supra note 62, at 301 (while important, NEPA's impact on agencies is not
uniform); Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189,
1287 (1986). But see Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239
(1973); Strohbehn, supra note 13, at 104 (unless changed, NEPA will "have only a
limited impact on agency decisionmaking, particularly at policy levels").
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in order to achieve an environmental goal was a significant shift of
policy premises. 165
At the very least, NEPA's substantive and procedural mandates influ-
ence governmental decisionmaking by requiring the consideration of
environmental effects along with economic factors prior to engaging in
any "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment."'' 66 The following analysis of NEPA and its leg-
islative history, however, demonstrates that Congress intended the
statute to require more than merely adding environmental concerns to
the decisionmaking calculus. NEPA's underlying substantive goals
suggest that Congress intended environmental factors to be given a
priority over other factors. This view of NEPA is not only the one
that Congress espoused, but it is also the interpretation that must be
adopted and enforced if Alaska's natural resources are to be protected
from irresponsible and excessive governmental activities.
A. NEPA and Its Legislative History
The substantive goals underlying NEPA's procedural mandate
(section 102) are contained primarily in section 101 of the Act and are
further explained in its legislative history. 167 Section 101 professes to
165. Dreyfus,& Ingram, The National Environmental Policy Act: A View of Intent
and Practice, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 243, 245 (1976); accord R. LIROFF, supra note
160, at 81 ("NEPA was a comprehensive attack on narrow agency decision-making
schemas. Its goal was to overhaul fundamentally an incremental decision-making
process in which the pursuit of narrow economic goals had obscured the need to
weigh environmental impact.").
166. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982).
167. In considering the nature of the substantive goals underlying section
102(2)(C), it is appropriate to consider the substantive goals of section 101. First,
section 102(1) expressly provides that the policies established in section 101 and other
sections within the chapter should apply. Section 102(1) provides that "the policies,
regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered
in accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter ...." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1),
discussed supra note 62 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the Senate Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs, in reference to the purpose of section 102, explained:
The policies and goals set forth in section 101 can be implemented if
they are incorporated into the ongoing activities of the Federal Government
in carrying out its responsibilities to the public. In many areas of Federal
action there is no body of experience or precedent for substantial and consis-
tent consideration of environmental factors in decisionmaking. In some
areas of Federal activity, existing legislation does not provide clear authority
for the consideration of environmental factors which conflict with other
objectives.
To remedy present shortcomings in the legislative foundation of ex-
isting programs, and to establish action-forcing procedures which will help
to insure that the policies enunciated in section 101 are implemented, section
102 authorizes and directs ....
S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 14, at 19 (1969); accord infra note 208 and
accompanying text. Second, unless a reviewing court is considering the validity of an
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establish a national environmental policy intended to create and main-
tain "conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive
harmony."' 168 Specifically, section 101 provides:
(a) The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activ-
ity on the interrelations of all components of the natural environ-
ment, particularly the profound influences of population growth,
high-density urbanization, industrial expansion, resource exploita-
tion, and new and expanding technological advances and recogniz-
ing further the critical importance of restoring and maintaining
environmental quality to the overall welfare and development of
man, declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Govern-
ment, in cooperation with State and local governments, and other
concerned public and private organizations, to use all practicable
means and measures,1691 including financial and technical assist-
ance in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general wel-
fare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature
can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social economic, and
administrative agency's interpretation of a statute, the Court permits a wholistic ap-
proach to statutory construction, that is, an analysis of the entire Act, rather than an
analysis of each section as an independent entity with its own legislative history, is
appropriate. Compare International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 805,
812 (1987) (In determining whether FWPCA preempts common law, the Court ex-
plains: "Given that the Act itself does not speak directly to the issue, the Court must
be guided by the goals and policies of the Act in determining whether it in fact
preempts an action based on the law of an affected State.") with Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (In reviewing
an agency's construction of a statute, a court must first consider "whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence
of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer
is based on a permissible construction of the statute." (emphasis added)).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1982).
169. In section 101(b) Congress further defined the Government's responsibility to
invoke "all practicable means" in fulfilling the policy objectives of the chapter. Sec-
tion 101(b) provides:
(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the contin-
uing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means,
consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve
and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end
that the Nation may -
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the envi-
ronment for succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and estheti-
cally and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment with-
out degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unin-
tended consequences;
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other requirements of present and future generations of
Americans. 170
Although section 101(a) applies only to governmental actions, Con-
gress set forth an environmental policy goal for individuals as well.
Section 101(c) provides: "The Congress recognizes... that each per-
son has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhance-
ment of the environment." 171
The national environmental policy expressed by section 101 is
founded on Congress' belief that: (1) man must establish a harmoni-
ous relationship with his environment; and (2) the present generation
of Americans has an obligation to future generations in the form of an
environmental trust. Utilitarianism cannot support such a policy. In-
stead, with NEPA Congress clearly intended to enact an environmen-
tal policy founded on duty-based environmentalism. As such it is a
policy founded on a belief that man is dependent on his environment
and that our exploitative policies have pushed us to the brink of de-
struction. Consequently, to ensure man's continued existence, we
must develop and maintain a harmonious and protective relationship
with the environment. Indeed, the Senate Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs17 2 clearly stated that such a view of the present state of
affairs vis-A-vis man's relationship to the environment as well as pres-
ent and future obligations provided the substantive base for the na-
tional environmental policy espoused in section 101. For example, the
Senate Committee explained:
[Section 101(a)] is a declaration by the Congress of a national
environmental policy. The declaration is based upon a congres-
sional recognition of mankind's dependence upon his physical and
biological surroundings for material goods and cultural enrichment.
It is further based upon a recognition of the increasing pressures
exerted upon the environment as a result of population growth, ur-
banization, industrial expansion, resource exploitation, and techno-
logical development. 173
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our
national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment
which supports diversity and variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will
permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities;
and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the max-
imum attainable recycling of depletable resources.
42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1982).
170. Id. § 4331(a) (emphasis added).
171. Id. § 4331(c).
172. S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 14 (1969).
173. Id. at 17. The conference substitute, which was enacted, retained the "na-
tional goals of environmental policy specified in the Senate bill" in the new section
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After thoroughly discussing the purpose, 174 legislative history,175 state
of the environment, 76 and the proposed bill's relationship to existing
policies and institutions, 177 the Committee provided the following
summary of its motivation in drafting a national environmental policy
and its understanding of the policy's effect on the nation's economic
interests:
Natural beauty, increased recreational opportunity, urban es-
thetics and other amenities would be important byproducts of a na-
tional environmental policy .... But the compelling reasons for a
national policy are more deeply based. The survival of man in a
world in which decency and dignity are possible, is the basic reason
for bringing man's impact on his environment under informed and
responsible control.... In our management of the environment we
have exceeded its adaptive and recuperative powers, and in one
form or another we must now pay directly the costs of maintaining
air, water, soil, and living space in quantities and qualities sufficient
to our needs.... Today we have the option of channeling some of
our wealth into the protection of our future. If we fail to do this in
an adequate and timely manner, we may find ourselves confronted,
even in this generation, with an environmental catastrophe that
could render our wealth meaningless and which no amount of
money could ever cure. 178
It is clear from the language of section 101 and its legislative his-
tory that Congress intended to enact an environmental policy that
would ensure the establishment and maintenance of a harmonious re-
lationship between man and nature. Furthermore, it appears that
while in the implementation of this national environmental policy eco-
nomic factors should be considered, they should not govern resulting
decisions.179 Although Congress did not preclude the consideration of
economic factors in establishing and maintaining "conditions under
which man and nature can exist in productive harmony,"'' s0 the lan-
guage and history indicate that Congress considered environmental
factors to be paramount. At most, Congress meant for cost efficiency
principles to be a decisionmaking tool.'8'
Whether NEPA can be viewed as embodying an environmental
policy founded on duty-based environmentalism is as much a product
101(b). H.R. CONF. REP. No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 8, reprinted in part in 1969
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2767, 2768.
174. S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 14, at 8-10 (1969).
175. Id. at 10-13.
176. Id. at 13-17.
177. Id. at 17-20.
178. Id. at 17.
179. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 1502.23 (1987), discussed infra notes 198-200 and ac-
companying text.
180. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1982).
181. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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of its judicial and administrative interpretation as it is of the language
employed by Congress. Therefore, to determine if NEPA will ensure
that government activity is conducted in a manner preserving the in-
tegrity of Alaska's physical and biological resources, the Act's judicial
and administrative applications must be considered.
V. ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF NEPA
Although Congress based the environmental policy contained in
section 101 on duty-based environmentalism, application of NEPA's
substantive goals has been, at best, inconsistent. A comparison of the
EIS guidelines promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality
("CEQ") and the federal courts' application of NEPA illustrates this
inconsistency. This Section first discusses CEQ's guidelines, which:
(1) federal agencies completing an EIS must follow; (2) reflect a view
that NEPA is not merely procedural; and (3) support this author's
interpretation that the precept underlying NEPA's substantive goals is
duty-based environmentalism.
Second, this Section analyzes the federal courts' application of
NEPA, focusing on the Supreme Court's decision in Baltimore Gas &
Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 182 and the un-
derlying appellate and district court decisions. Having discussed Bal-
timore Gas, which this author interprets to be based on a view that
NEPA is "essentially procedural,"' 183 the Court's decision is modified
by this author to reflect an opinion founded on: (1) a view that NEPA
is essentially substantive and based on environmentally-conscious util-
itarianism; and (2) a belief that NEPA is essentially substantive and
founded on duty-based environmentalism. This analysis illustrates the
consequences of a shift in judicial interpretation of NEPA that is re-
flected in the Court's holdings in Amoco Production Co. v. Village of
Gambel118 4 and Motor Vehicle Manufacturers' Association v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 185 As demonstrated, the ef-
fect of such a shift is further amplified by whether the precept underly-
ing NEPA is one that is utilitarian- or environmentally-based.
A. Administrative Interpretation of NEPA
In addition to enacting an environmental policy and a scheme
necessary to implement the policy, Congress also created the CEQ. 186
Among its numerous responsibilities and pursuant to Executive Order,
182. 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
183. See infra notes 245-248 and accompanying text.
184. - U.S. _, 107 S. Ct. 1396 (1987), discussed supra notes 52-89 and accompa-
nying text.
185. 463 U.S. 29 (1983), discussed supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
186. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-4347 (1982).
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the CEQ has the authority to promulgate guidelines for EIS prepara-
tions.1s7 Initially, these guidelines were merely advisory, but in 1977
President Jimmy Carter ordered federal agencies to comply with the
CEQ regulations when preparing EIS's. 1 88
The regulations promulgated by the CEQ underscore Congress'
intent to establish an environmental policy designed to protect the en-
vironment and establish a harmonious relationship between man and
nature. In interpreting the purpose of the Act, the CEQ explained:
[NEPA] is our basic national charter for protection of the environ-
ment. It establishes policy, sets goals (section 101), and provides
means (section 102) for carrying out the policy. Section 102(2) con-
tains "action forcing" provisions to make sure that federal agencies
act according to the letter and spirit of the Act .... The President,
the federal agencies, and the courts share responsibility for enforc-
ing the Act so as to achieve the substantive requirements of section
101.189
The CEQ's view of NEPA differs from that of the courts. Rather
than emphasizing NEPA's procedural mandate (section 102) as do the
courts, 190 the CEQ considers the procedural mandate to be merely a
means for achieving NEPA's substantive goals. There is no indication
that the CEQ considers NEPA to be "essentially procedural." In-
stead, the "NEPA process," as the CEQ sets forth, "is intended to
help public officials make decisions that are based on understanding of
environmental consequences, and take actions that protect, restore,
and enhance the environment." 191 This view of the process -
NEPA's procedural mandate - is in accord with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the procedures contained in the FWPCA192 and
ANILCA 193 and dissimilar from that attributed to NEPA by the
Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit.194
187. See Exec. Order No. 11,514 3 C.F.R. § 902 (1966-70) (order issued March 5,
1970 in which section 3(h) authorized the CEQ to issue guidelines to federal agencies
for preparation of EIS's under NEPA 102(2)(C)).
188. Exec. Order 11,991, 3 C.F.R. § 123 (1978) (order issued May 24, 1977
amending sections 2(g) and 3(h) of Executive Order 11,514; thereby granting the CEQ
the authority to issue mandatory regulations for the implementation of NEPA section
102(2)(C)).
189. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (1987).
190. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 13.
191. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) (1987).
192. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 314 (1982) ("The integrity of
the Nation's waters, however, not the permit process, is the purpose of the
FWPCA.").
193. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1396, 1403
(1987) ("Like the First Circuit in Romero-Barcelo, the Ninth Circuit erroneously fo-
cused on [ANILCA's] procedure rather than on the underlying substantive policy the
process was designed to effect ....").
194. See cases cited supra note 13.
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Not only does the CEQ's view of NEPA's structure conflict with
that of the Court's, but its view of NEPA's substantive mandate (to
the extent that Baltimore Gas is founded on NEPA's substantive man-
date)195 seems to differ as well. Contrary to the Court's interpretation
that NEPA merely requires a generic balancing of environmental
harms and benefits with other relevant harms and benefits, 196 the
CEQ's guidelines view NEPA as an Act designed to protect the envi-
ronment. The CEQ explains that, "to the fullest extent possible," fed-
eral agencies, "shall" [u]se all practicable means, consistent with the
requirements of the Act and other essential considerations of national
policy, to restore and enhance the quality of the human environment
and avoid or minimize any possible adverse effects of their actions
upon the quality of the human environment. 197 This language is in
accord with the enforcement of an environmental policy based on
duty-based environmentalism.
Furthermore, to the extent that "cost-benefit analysis [is] relevant
to the choice among environmentally different alternatives,"' 98 the
CEQ requires that it "shall be incorporated by reference or appended
to the statement as an aid in evaluating the environmental conse-
quences." 199 The CEQ considers benefit-cost analysis to be used under
NEPA as a decisionmaking tool, as is consistent with a duty-based
environmental policy, and not a decisionmaking rule, as under an en-
vironmental policy based on environmental-conscious utilitarianism.
The CEQ further substantiates this role for benefit-cost analysis by
explaining: "For purposes of complying with the Act, the weighing of
the merits and drawbacks of the various alternatives need not be dis-
played in a monetary cost-benefit analysis and should not be when
there are important qualitative considerations. ' '20°
In addition to being mandatory, the Supreme Court and the
Ninth Circuit have held that the "CEQ's interpretation of NEPA is
entitled to substantial deference. 201 Unfortunately, neither the
Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit have looked to the CEQ's inter-
pretation of NEPA's substantive goals when determining whether an
EIS or an administrator's actions pursuant to an EIS comply with
195. See infra notes 245-48 and accompanying text.
196. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983), discussed infra notes 245-48 and accompanying text.
197. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2(f) (1987).
198. Id. § 1502.23.
199. Id. (emphasis added).
200. Id.
201. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979); accord California v. Block,
690 F.2d 753, 763 (9th Cir. 1982); Village of False Pass v. Watt, 565 F. Supp. 1123,
1149 (D. Alaska 1983), aff'd, 733 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1984).
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NEPA's mandate. In Village of False Pass v. Watt,2 0 2 the United
States District Court for the District of Alaska relied heavily on the
CEQ's regulations in its determination that the EIS did not adequately
consider the dangers to whales associated with preliminary seismic ac-
tivity. The court explained: "Although the rule of reason determines
the adequacy of an environmental impact statement, [the CEQ] regu-
lations are also guides for determining its sufficiency. ' 20 3 Despite this
rhetoric, the court did not measure the adequacy of the EIS against
NEPA's substantive goals set forth in section 101 of the Act and inter-
preted in the CEQ regulations. Instead, the court confined its review
to whether the EIS complied with NEPA's procedural mandate. 20 4
Consequently, although the CEQ regulations acknowledge NEPA's
substantive goals as its essence and the courts claim that these regula-
tions are entitled to substantial deference, the courts' view that NEPA
is "essentially procedural" effectively requires a reviewing court to ig-
nore the Act's substantive goals and those regulations promulgated by
the CEQ that interpret and apply NEPA's substantive mandate.
B. Judicial Interpretation and Application of NEPA
Despite the clarity of the national environmental policy drafted
by Congress and its subsequent interpretation by the CEQ, NEPA has
neither been interpreted nor applied as a policy based on principles of
environmentalism. NEPA has not been viewed to be an "Environ-
mental Bill of Rights" 20 5 or even as a full disclosure law favoring envi-
ronmental concerns.2 0 6 Furthermore, when called upon to interpret
NEPA, the Supreme Court and the the Ninth Circuit have empha-
sized its procedural nature while effectively ignoring its substantive
goals.20 7
202. 565 F. Supp. 1123, 1144-45, 1149 (D. Alaska 1983), aff'd, 733 F.2d 605 (9th
Cir. 1984).
203. Id. at 1144.
204. Id. at 1151-52.
205. In 1970, Professors Eva and John Hanks described NEPA in the following
terms: "In form, [NEPA] is a statute; in spirit a constitution." Hanks & Hanks,
supra note 144, at 245. After analyzing NEPA and its legislative history, id. at 244-
69, they conclude that NEPA "could well become our Environmental Bill of Rights."
Id. at 269.
206. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983); Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen,
444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980).
207. See supra notes 13-25 and accompanying text; see generally Goldsmith &
Banks, supra note 14, at 12 (authors conclude that when read merely as a generic "full
disclosure" law, "NEPA does not require federal agencies to protect the nation's envi-
ronment, but simply instructs them to take whatever action they please as long as they
keep their eyes open to the environmental consequences.")
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To hold that NEPA is merely a procedural statute that requires
nothing more than a generic balancing process undermines NEPA's
substantive mandate in two ways. First, it ignores NEPA's structure
- section 102 is dependent on section 101.208 Section 102 merely im-
plements the national environmental policy established by section 101;
consequently, by emphasizing NEPA's procedural mandate over its
substantive goals, the courts wrongly disregard the importance of the
national environmental policy set forth in NEPA's substantive
goals.20 9 This error inherent in viewing NEPA as "essentially proce-
dural," and thereby effectively ignoring the Act's substantive goals, is
further supported by the statutory construction employed by the
Supreme Court in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo210 and Amoco Pro-
duction Co. v. Village of Gambell.211 Second, the Court's interpreta-
tion that environmental factors should be weighed equally with other
factors contravenes NEPA's environmental policy, which is founded
on duty-based environmentalism.
These two impacts of the Court's interpretations and applications
of NEPA can best be illustrated by analyzing the Court's most recent
NEPA decision, Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,21 2 and then demonstrating how the opinion
would have differed had the Court considered NEPA's (1) procedural
mandate to be subordinate to its substantive goals, and (2) substantive
goals to require environmental considerations to be given priority over
other factors. Because the judicial interpretation and application of
NEPA in the Ninth Circuit echoes that of the Supreme Court, such a
shift in the judicial construction of NEPA would have a similar effect
in the Ninth Circuit. Consequently, such a shift would restore the
importance of the CEQ's guidelines and ensure that NEPA would not
be viewed as merely a generic full disclosure law. NEPA could then
be employed as it should be - as a national environmental policy re-
quiring federal activities to be consistent with the establishment and
208. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1980), discussed supra note 62 and accompanying text; see
also United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),
412 U.S. 669, 693 (1973); 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (1987) (CEQ mandatory EIS guide-
lines), discussed supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text; Andrews, supra note 62,
at 301-02; Liebesman, supra note 62, at 50,039-40; Peterson, supra note 62, at 50,040;
Note, supra note 62, at 367-68.
209. This is precisely what the Supreme Court held with regard to section 810(a) of
ANILCA in Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 805
(1987).
210. 456 U.S. 305, 314-15 (1982), discussed supra notes 55-58 and accompanying
text.
211. - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1396, 1403 (1987), discussed supra notes 58, 74-77 and
accompanying text.
212. 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
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maintenance of a harmonious relationship between man and Alaska's"
awesome, yet fragile environment.
1. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. Baltimore Gas213 represents the culmination of a
twelve year dispute between the Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. ("NRDC") and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("Commis-
sion"). At the heart of the controversy lies the decisions of the Atomic
Safety and Licensing Board ("Board"), the Atomic Safety and Licens-
ing Appeal Board ("Appeal Board"), and the Commission concerning
the environmental effects resulting from the disposal of uranium fuel-
cycle wastes. In 1971, the Board rejected the NRDC's attempt to
have the environmental effects of nuclear wastes considered in the
Board's decision whether to grant an operating license to Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Station.214 In June 1972, the Appeal Board
affirmed the Board's decision. 215 Subsequently, the Commission initi-
ated rulemaking procedures to promulgate rules concerning "whether,
and if so, how, it should consider the environmental impact of the
fuel-cycle as it continued licensing nuclear facilities. ' 216 On April 16,
1974, the Commission adopted Table S-3, which designated numerical
values representing the environmental effects of the uranium fuel-
cycle. 217 Additionally, the ruling amended the Commission's NEPA
regulations, thereby enabling consideration of the uranium fuel-cycle's
environmental effects for individual light water reactors to be satisfied
by including Table S-3 in an EIS. 218 Moreover, the Commission con-
cluded that if Table S-3 was included in an EIS, then "no further dis-
cussion of such environmental effects shall be required. '219
The NRDC, challenged, inter alia, the Commission's rule con-
cerning Table S-3 and its use in the NEPA process. The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed and remanded
the Table S-3 Rule and its application in the granting of an operating
213. Id.
214. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("NRDC II"), rev'd sub nom. Baltimore
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 469.
217. Id. Specifically, Table S-3, as explained by the Supreme Court, was "a numer-
ical compilation of the estimated resources used and effluents released by fuel cycle
activities supporting a year's operation of a typical light-water reactor." Baltimore
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 91 (1983).
218. NRDC II, 685 F.2d at 469.
219. Id. (citing 39 Fed. Reg. 14,191 (1974)).
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*license to Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.220 The court
opined that the record supporting the Table S-3 Rule was insuffi-
cient,22' and that the procedures used by the Commission in promul-
gating the Rule were, in part, inadequate.222 In Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 223 the
United States Supreme Court then reversed the appellate court's deci-
sion concerning the Commission's Table S-3 Rule. The Court rea-
soned that the courts could not require the administrative agencies to
employ additional procedures during informal rulemaking, if those
used met the "statutory minima, a matter about which there [was] no
doubt in this case."' 224 The Court, however, remanded the question
concerning whether "the challenged rule [found] sufficient justification
in the administrative proceedings that it should be upheld by the re-
viewing court. '225
On remand before the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, the NRDC presented a two-pronged challenge
to the Table S-3 Rules. The NRDC first asserted that "the original,
interim and final versions of the Table S-3 Rule [were] arbitrary and
capricious and not in accordance with NEPA because they pre-
clude[ed] proper consideration and disclosure of uncertainties that
underl[ay] the Table's numerical values. ' 226 Second, the NRDC al-
leged that the original and interim Table S-3 Rules were arbitrary and
capricious. 227 Furthermore, because they barred adequate considera-
tion and disclosure of the actual environmental effects that nuclear
power plant waste would cause, the Table S-3 Rules violated section
102 of NEPA.228 The court held:
[T]he Table S-3 Rules [were] arbitrary and in violation of NEPA
because they fail[ed] to allow for consideration of uncertainties
underlying the assumption that no radiological effluents [would] be
released into the biosphere once wastes [were] sealed in a permanent
repository.... [T]he original Rule and the interim Rule, prior to
amendment, [were] arbitrary and in violation of NEPA in their fail-
ure to allow consideration of health, socioeconomic, and cumulative
effects of fuel-cycle activities. 229
220. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 653-54 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("NRDC I"), rev'd sub nom. Ver-
mont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519 (1978).
221. Id. at 654.
222. Id. at 647-52.
223. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
224. Id. at 548.
225. Id. at 549.
226. NRDC II, 685 F.2d at 477.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 477-78.
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In considering the Commission's conclusion that no radiological
effluents would be released into the environment from a sealed perma-
nent repository,2 30 the court reviewed the factual record and the Com-
mission's reasoning supporting this zero-level release assumption from
two reference points. First, the court evaluated zero-level release as if
it were the product of a factual finding of no significant risk.231 As
such, the court determined that the zero-level release assumption had
no factual support. It reasoned that the Commission's judgment was
clearly erroneous, because, despite the fact that the Commission ad-
mitted and the record reflected that considerable technological and in-
stitutional uncertainty existed concerning the ability to construct and
maintain the requisite facility, the Commission had "based its zero-
release assumption on a prediction that technology would be devel-
oped by which to isolate long-lived wastes from the biosphere indefi-
nitely. '232 This uncertainty, the court concluded, rendered the
Commission's zero-release assumption arbitrary and capricious.233
Second, the court considered the zero-release assumption as a
decisionmaking rule and likewise found it 'wanting. The court did not
conclude, however, that the zero-release assumption was arbitrary and
capricious. Instead, it found that, if used as a decisionmaking rule, the
zero-release assumption violated NEPA.2 34 The court reasoned that
although "an agency in the position of the Commission [was] free to
implement NEPA through generic rulemaking," 235 the generic
rulemaking must permit an agency to consider all environmental costs
when determining whether to proceed with a "major Federal action[ ]
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. '236 "The
zero-release assumption, however, exclude[d] from [licensing boards']
230. The zero-release assumption - the assumption "that radiological effluents
from solidified high-level and transuranic wastes would have no effect on the environ-
ment once sealed in a federal repository," id. at 474 - was present in the original,
interim, and final versions of the Table S-3 Rule. Id. at 468-75.
231. Id. at 480.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 481.
234. Id. at 484.
235. Id. at 482. The court further explained:
If certain types of environmental costs are common to a class of actions,
NEPA does not require that an agency engage in duplicative and possibly
inconsistent individual determinations, but allows it, in the alternative, to
conduct a single rulemaking to determine generic values to be considered
together with case-specific costs and benefits in individual proceedings. Sim-
ilarly, if there are both costs and benefits in common to a class of individual
actions, an agency is free, not only to determine generic values for those
costs and benefits, but also to weigh the costs and benefits against each other
to produce a generic "net value."
Id.
236. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982).
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consideration of two [environmental] factors: 1) uncertainty concern-
ing the integrity of the permanent repository, if such a repository [was]
ever built; and 2) uncertainty over whether and when such a reposi-
tory, or equivalent system of disposal, [would] be developed." 237 The
Commission's zero-release assumption was neither based on a "rule
that the costs were insignificant, nor... that they were outweighed by
generic benefits that would also be excluded from licensing boards'
consideration, ' 238 but rather from the Commission's determination
that "licensing decisions should be made on the basis of cost-benefit
analyses that omitted the costs represented by those uncertainties. '239
The court found, therefore, that the Commission's ruling "directly
contravened NEPA's requirement that environmental costs be consid-
ered 'at every stage where an overall balancing of environmental and
nonenvironmental factors [was] appropriate.' 240
The NRDC also challenged the original and interim Table S-3
Rules because they precluded the consideration and disclosure of the
health, socioeconomic, and cumulative impacts of the fuel-cycle activi-
ties.241 The court agreed. Although the original and interim Rules
contained calculations depicting the fuel-cycle's environmental im-
pacts in terms of the "quantity of land, water, and energy used, and of
heat, chemicals and radioactivity released, ' 242 Table S-3 failed to show
the "meaning of those impacts in terms of human health or other envi-
ronmental values. '2 43 The court, therefore, interpreted NEPA to re-
quire more than a mere disclosure of the fuel-cycle's consumptive
needs and releases. Rather, as it explained, "it [was] not releases of
curies that Congress wanted disclosed; it [was] the effects, or environ-
mental significance, of those releases." 244
In Baltimore Gas, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate
court's decision in NRDC II. Prior to deciding the merits, the Court
considered the nature of NEPA, explaining:
NEPA has twin aims. First, it "places upon an agency the obliga-
tion to consider every significant aspect of the environmental impact
of a proposed action." Second, it ensures that the agency will in-
form the public that it has indeed considered environmental con-
cems in its decisionmaking process. Congress in enacting NEPA,
however, did not require agencies to elevate environmental concerns
over other appropriate considerations. Rather, it required only that
237. NRDC II 685 F.2d at 483.
238. Id. at 483.
239. Id.
240. Id. (quoting Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States
Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
241. Id. at 486-87.
242. Id. at 486.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 487.
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the agency take a "hard look" at the environmental consequences
before taking a major action. The role of the courts is simply to
ensure that the agency has adequately considered and disclosed the
environmental impact of its actions and that its decision is not arbi-
trary and capricious. 245
The implication of the Court's interpretation of NEPA's goals -
an interpretation also adopted in the Ninth Circuit 246 - are twofold.
First, its findings that NEPA "places upon an agency the obligation to
consider.. ." and "ensures that an agency will inform... that it has
indeed considered ... "247 constitute a determination that NEPA's es-
sence is its procedural mandate. Under this view, NEPA is merely a
generic full disclosure law void of a substantive mandate to protect the
environment. In short, the Court's decision perpetuates the view that
NEPA is "essentially procedural. '248
Second, because the Court finds that NEPA's substance is its pro-
cedure, it is resigned to employing an extremely deferential scope of
review. Although in Baltimore Gas the Court describes its role in a
manner similar to the one it assumed in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,249 the dif-
ference in the actual review conducted is shocking.250 State Farm is
generally considered the apex of judicial scrutiny, 251 whereas Balti-
more Gas has been viewed as an example of extreme judicial defer-
ence.252 This result can be attributed to the Court's construction of
245. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462
U.S. 87, 97-98 (1983) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
246. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Clark, 774 F.2d 1406, 1411 (9th Cir. 1985); Forelaws
on Board v. Johnson, 743 F.2d 677, 686 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, - U.S.-, 106 S.
Ct. 3293 (1986).
247. Baltimore Gas, 462 U.S. at 97.
248. See, e.g., Note, supra note 48, at 863-65. But see Weinstein, supra note 48, at
865-83.
249. 463 U.S. 29 (1983), discussed supra notes 41-46.
250. Compare State Farm, 463 U.S. at 46-57 with Baltimore Gas, 462 U.S. at 97-
106.
251. See, e.g., Edwards, Judicial Review of Deregulation, 11 N. Ky. L. REV. 229,
253-55 (1984); Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505,
545-49 (1985); Shapiro & Levy, supra note 34, at 411, 423-25.
252. See, e.g., Shapiro & Levy, supra note 34, at 432 n.215; Stever, Deference to
Administrative Agencies in Federal Environmental Health and Safety Litigation -
Thoughts on Varying Judicial Application of the Rule, 6 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 35,
58-59 (1983); Note, supra note 48, at 860-64.
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the two statutes involved.2 53 Had the Court considered NEPA's sub-
stantive goals to be those included in section 101, then, using the "ra-
tionalist model of judicial review, ' 254 its decision may have differed
significantly from its actual decision described below.2 55
In determining that the zero-release assumption was reasonable,
the Court found that three factors were particularly probative. First,
the Commission intended to apply the assumption in limited circum-
stances and it was not adopted as a means to select the "most effective
long-term waste disposal technology or develop site selection crite-
ria."' 256 Second, the zero-release assumption was "but a single figure
in an entire Table, which the Commission expressly designed as a risk-
adverse estimate of the environmental impact of the fuel cycle." 257
Third, because the Commission's decision was "within its area of spe-
cial expertise, at the frontiers of science, '2 58 and involved scientific
determinations, "a reviewing court must generally be at its most
deferential. '25 9
The Court then reviewed the facts and reasons underlying the
zero-release assumption and concluded that "the zero-release assump-
tion - a policy judgment concerning one line in a conservative Table
designed for the limited purpose of individual licensing decisions -
[was] within the bounds of reasoned decisionmaking. 2 60 It held,
therefore, that the assumption was neither arbitrary nor capricious. In
so holding, the Court emphasized: (1) the limited purpose of the as-
sumption; (2) the conservative nature of Table S-3, that is, when
viewed in its entirety the "Table represented a conservative (i.e., in-
flated) statement of environmental impacts;"'2 61 and (3) the uncertain-
ties involved in determining the environmental effects of long-term
storage of high-level radioactive wastes coupled with the Commission
staff's conclusion that the "[r]isks (probabilities times consequences)
253. But see Shapiro & Levy, supra note 34, at 432 n.215 (Court's decision based
on a view that the lower court erroneously focused on the result of the agency's deci-
sion rather than the reasoning - reasoning and not results are the focus of heightened
scrutiny).
254. See supra notes 42-45, 51 and accompanying text.
255. See infra notes 269-77 and accompanying text.
256. Baltimore Gas, 462 U.S. at 102.
257. Id. at 102-03. The Court further reasoned that: "It is not unreasonable for
the Commission to counteract the uncertainties in postsealing releases by balancing
them with an overestimate of presealing releases. A reviewing court should not mag-
nify a single line item beyond its significance as only part of a larger Table." Id. at 103
(footnote omitted).
258. Id. at 103.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 105.
261. Id. at 103.
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inherent in the long term for geological disposal will ... be small. '262
Furthermore, the Court appears to have given some weight to the fact
that neither the NRDC challenged, nor the court of appeals decided,
the reasonableness of the Commission's determination that "the
probabilities favor[ed] the zero-release assumption, because the Nation
is likely to develop methods to store the wastes with no leakage to the
environment. " 2 6 3
Finally, the Court concurred with the appellate court's interpre-
tation that NEPA requires more than listing environmental impacts in
"technical terms. '"264 Nevertheless, the Court reversed the appellate
court's determination that the original and interim Table S-3 Rules
precluded a licensing board from using the technical terms contained
in the Table to evaluate health, socioeconomic, and cumulative conse-
quences of the fuel-cycle. 265
The Court's decision in Baltimore Gas is based entirely on
NEPA's procedural mandate. Not once does the Court mention
NEPA's underlying substantive goals. NEPA's "twin aims, ' 266 as ex-
plained by the Court, are founded solely in the Act's procedural man-
date. In addition to ignoring NEPA's substantive goals, the Court's
decision also is extremely deferential 267 to the Commission's interpre-
tation and application of NEPA. Hence, when coupled, these two as-
pects of the Court's analysis enabled it to determine that NEPA does
not require the evaluation of environmental concerns over other fac-
tors and that the zero-release assumption was reasonable despite the
uncertainty and risk presented by the long-term disposal of high-level
radioactive and transuranic wastes. In fact, had it been based on the
substantive goals of section 101 of NEPA, as the Court's recent deci-
sion in Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambel1268 would require,
the scope of review employed by the Court would possibly have led to
an opposite conclusion. The decision, however, would not have been a
function of deference, but rather contingent upon whether the Court
viewed NEPA's substance as utilitarian- or environmentally-based.
The implications of these two possibilities are discussed below.
262. Id. at 105.
263. Id. at 98.
264. Id. at 106-07.
265. Id. at 107-08.
266. Id. at 97, discussed supra notes 245-48 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 250-52 and accompanying text.
268. - U.S. , 107 S. Ct. 1396 (1987), discussed supra notes 52-89 and accompa-
nying text.
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2. Baltimore Gas Reconsidered.
a. NEPA's Substantive Mandate Considered to be Utilitarian-
Based. If the Court had determined that NEPA's substantive goals
were utilitarian-based, its decision would not have changed, provided
it maintained its belief that NEPA did not require the elevation of
environmental factors above relevant nonenvironmental considera-
tions. Despite the NRDC II court's finding that the zero-release as-
sumption precluded review of two environmental factors in the overall
balancing process, 269 the Supreme Court's determination that the
zero-release assumption was reasonable is consistent with a utilitarian-
based environmental policy.
Particularly, two reasons provided by the Court in support of its
decision satisfy an objective, benefit-cost methodology. First, as the
Court explained, the overall nature of the Table was "conservative;"
therefore, the undervaluation of environmental costs in one portion of
Table S-3 was accounted for by overvaluation in another section of the
Table.270 Environmentally neutral benefit-cost analysis will permit
such gerrymandering. Second, the risks (probabilities times magni-
tude of the harm) were small, whereas benefits in terms of energy pro-
duced by nuclear power were great. This fact in itself overcomes any
doubts associated with the uncertainties that plagued the NRDC II
court.
b. NEPA's Substantive Mandate Considered to be Environmen-
tally-Based. If, however, the Court had concluded that NEPA re-
quired environmental factors to be given a preference, then it should
have affirmed the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia. This result follows because the risk-side of
the benefit-cost calculation would exceed any benefits realized. Fur-
thermore, the mandate upon which the NRDC 11 court relied, namely
that NEPA requires environment costs to be considered at "every
stage where an overall balancing of environmental and nonenviron-
mental factors is appropriate,"'271 becomes non-negotiable when envi-
ronmental factors warrant a preference. Hence, the Court's reliance
on the overall "conservative" effect of the Table S-3 to justify the ex-
clusion of several environmental costs underlying one of the calcula-
tions involved would be erroneous. The method employed by the
269. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
271. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States, 685 F.2d 459, 483
(D.C. Cir. 1982) ("NRDC II"), rev'd sub nom. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983), discussed supra note 240 and
accompanying text.
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appellate court in NRDC II is representative of a benefit-cost balanc-
ing approach that provides a preference for environmental factors. 272
Furthermore, the obligation to future generations would have
warranted invalidating the zero-release rule. The safe disposal of
high-level radioactive wastes is an obligation that the present genera-
tion has to all future people, as defined by Professor Annette Baier.273
This obligation exists because of the severity and long-term environ-
mental effects associated with the release of high-level radioactive and
transuranic wastes. Hence, the zero-release assumption, which is
based on uncertainty and technological optimism, contravenes an en-
vironmental policy founded on duty-based environmentalism.
Second, the zero-release assumption contained in Table S-3 is
founded on technological optimism and, therefore, is contrary to the
establishment and maintenance of a productive harmony between man
and the environment. As demonstrated in Section III, technological
optimism and a harmonious relationship between man and the envi-
ronment are incompatible, unless political and societal growth paral-
lels technological development. 274 The zero-release assumption
contains no such coupling.
Third, the use of the generic zero-release rule as a decisionmaking
rule eliminates citizen participation and precludes consideration of the
assumption's viability as applied to particular power plant licensing.
Hence, it prevents the consideration of citizen values and the convic-
tions of the hypothetical community ("Z") in which a power plant,
nuclear waste facility, or both, will be constructed. This result places
the members of Z in the same predicament as those of Lewiston, New
York.275 Because the decision underlying the disposal of the wastes
was made on cost efficiency grounds, the residents of Lewiston, as Pro-
fessor Mark Sagoff explains, were powerless in their citizen capacity.
He reasons:
[T]he citizens of Lewiston, surrounded by dynamos, high tension
lines, and nuclear wastes, are powerless. They do not know how to
criticize power, resist power, or justify power - for to do so de-
pends on making distinctions between good and evil, right and
wrong, innocence and guilt, justice and injustice, truth and lies.
These distinctions cannot be made out and have no significance
within an emotive or psychological theory of value. To adopt this
272. See supra notes 226-44 and accompanying text.
273. Baier, supra note 145, at 243, discussed supra notes 146-49 and accompanying
text.
274. See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
275. Sagoff, At the Shrine of Our Lady Fatima, or Why Political Questions Are Not
All Economic, in PEOPLE, PENGUINS, AND PLASTIC TREES 227, 227-28, 235-36 (D.
VanDeVeer & C. Pierce eds. 1986) (Lewiston is a community that is adjacent to a site
used by the military to dispose of Manhattan Project residues as well as other toxic
substances.).
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theory is to imagine society as a market in which individuals trade
voluntarily without coercion. No individual, no belief, no faith has
authority over them. To have power to act as a nation, however, we
must be able to act, at least at times, on a public philosophy, convic-
tion, or faith. We cannot replace with economic analyis the moral
function of public law.276
Because the generic zero-release assumption precludes the participa-
tion of the citizens of Z, and because it is founded on technological
optimism rather than community conviction or values, it too presents
the Lewiston dilemma. Therefore, it is contrary to a duty-based envi-
ronmental policy. For the above reasons, the Supreme Court would
have affirmed the appellate court's decision in NRDC I.
This analysis illustrates the importance of the weight given to and
the interpretation of NEPA's substantive mandate. When considered
as "essentially procedural" and as requiring only a generic benefit-cost
analysis, NEPA cannot achieve Congress' stated goal of establishing a
harmonious relationship between man and nature. Furthermore,
when viewed as a substantive Act based on utilitarian principles, the
same result is attained. Only where NEPA's substantive mandate is
interpreted to be environmentally-based and its broad sweeping sub-
stantive goals are considered above its procedural mandate can NEPA
achieve the goals espoused in the national environmental policy en-
acted by Congress. This change in focus and interpretation is neces-
sary if we are to protect Alaska's natural resources from irresponsible
and unnecessary governmental activities "significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment. '277
VI. CONCLUSION
NEPA attempts to establish an environmental policy based on
the understanding that man must develop a harmonious relationship
with the environment. Hence, pursuant to the above analysis, it would
appear that if (1) the Amoco Production Co. Court's interpretation of
section 810 of ANILCA is applied to section 102 of NEPA, and
(2) the State Farm Court's scope of review is employed, then the
Court's interpretation and application of NEPA section 102 in Balti-
more Gas is erroneous. Baltimore Gas is wrongly decided because it
(1) misconstrues the importance and nature of NEPA's underlying
substantive goals, and (2) is too deferential to the Commission's deci-
sion to adopt the zero-release assumption. Furthermore, the Ninth
Circuit's view that NEPA is "essentially procedural" is also
erroneous.
276. Id. at 235-36.
277. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982).
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As this article demonstrates, such an application of Amoco Pro-
duction Co. would have significant impacts on NEPA's interpretation
and application. Benefit-cost analysis would become just a tool, rather
than a policy-making rule.2 78 Although such an interpretation better
fulfills NEPA's substantive goals, it would entail a radical restructur-
ing of governmental decisionmaking. Furthermore, even if the courts
were to apply Amoco Production Co. to NEPA and accept NEPA's
underlying substance as being duty-based environmentalism, it is ques-
tionable whether such an interpretation would withstand congres-
sional scrutiny. Congress could either (1) amend NEPA to mirror the
Supreme Court's present view that NEPA is merely a generic benefit-
cost statute, or (2) exempt certain projects incapable of satisfying
NEPA's substantive goals. Congress' exemption of the trans-Alaska
oil pipeline from compliance with NEPA demonstrates its willingness
to retreat from the national environmental policy espoused in NEPA
where application of the Act jeopardizes the completion of an impor-
tant federal project.2 79
Hence, legislation is not sufficient to secure the establishment and
maintenance of a harmonious relationship between man and the envi-
ronment; instead a set of value-based rules is needed that will stand the
test of time and not be prone to tampering and redefinition with every
change in the political majority. The equivalent of a Bill of Rights is
necessary, because the success of a duty-based environmental policy is
a function of its becoming a value-based one upon which all decisions
affecting natural resources and the environment are made. Therefore,
not until such a set of rules is adopted by the citizenry and man's
relationship with nature changes from one predominantly utilitarian-
based to one environmentally-based will man have committed himself
to (1) preserving as well as morally using the earth's resources and
(2) adopting an environmental policy compatible with his nature. If
man is to assure his continued existence in a world where natural
beauty and integrity are present - a world in which natural wonders
such as those found in Alaska are preserved - he must adopt a policy
founded on duty-based environmentalism.
278. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
279. Faced with the potential of protracted litigation over the adequacy of the EIS
completed for the trans-Alaska oil pipeline, Congress enacted the Trans-Alaska Pipe-
line Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1655 (1982), thereby exempting the pipe-
line from any "further action under [NEPA]." Id. at § 1652(d). See generally The
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and the Energy Crisis: The Road to Alaska,
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 265, 296-327 (1974).
1988]

